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ABSTRACT 
This study investigates the impact monitoring by the board of directors had on the 
incidence of insider trading by firm chief executive officers (CEO) and on the abnormal 
returns they realized from 1996 to 2008. The study also analyzes the impact the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX) had on this relationship. The results show that CEOs earned 
significant abnormal returns on their buy and sell trades during this period. Furthermore, 
the results show that internal governance mechanisms such as board independence and 
CEO/Chairman duality reduce abnormal return and the intensity of CEOs' insider trades. 
The results are particularly significant for trades with more significant underlying 
nonpublic information. The results also show that SOX significantly reduced the 
abnormal returns and the intensity of CEOs’ insider trades. The results show that SOX 
weakened the impact of board independence in mitigating CEOs' insider trades, while it 
increased the impact of the CEO/chairman duality. The results indicate that internal 
governance mechanisms generally have more pronounced impact on sell trades than on 
buy trades.  
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1. Introduction 
  “ … among the central causes of the financial and economic crises that the United States faces 
today has been a widespread failure of corporate governance.” 
— Shareholder Bill of Rights Act, introduced in the U.S. Senate in May 2009 
 
 
 
Trading a firm’s securities by the firm’s insiders, who have access to nonpublic information 
about the firm, has been an issue of interest to several groups. Financial economists are interested in 
the topic because of the potential impact such trades can have on shareholders’ wealth as well as on 
financial markets’ performance. Striving to introduce effective regulation, policy makers are 
interested in the topic because of the implications for both fairness and performance of the markets. 
The public is interested in the topic because of the impact insider trading can have on shareholders’ 
wealth and investment decisions. 
 The recent economic recession, which started with problems in the financial sector, has 
raised the sensitivity of the public and academia about the regulatory environment in the financial 
markets, as well as various aspects of managerial behavior. One of the most important concerns 
about managerial behavior is the potential abuse of nonpublic information by managers in their 
personal trades. The popular news media widely covers news about cases of insider trading based 
on nonpublic information and warns about investors’ declining confidence in financial markets. 
While it has been widely suggested that insider trading based on nonpublic information is 
detrimental to investors’ wealth and the integrity of markets—and despite an extensive set of laws 
and regulations—there are indications in the financial literature that the regulation has not been 
fully effective in preventing the abuse of nonpublic information by firms’ insiders. As phrased by 
Jeng et al. (2003), only a “draconian regulatory system” could prevent insiders from profiting on 
their valuable insider information.  
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The main motivation for this study is the importance of protecting the integrity of markets. 
Fairness and integrity of stock markets are the basis for investors’ trust and confidence in the 
financial institutions. Arthur Levitt, former chairman of the Securities and Exchange Commission 
(SEC) once stated, “Our markets are a success precisely because they enjoy the world’s highest 
level of confidence. Investors put their capital to work—and put their fortunes at risk—because they 
trust that the marketplace is honest. They know that our securities laws require free, fair, and open 
transactions.”1 Certain behaviors by market participants, however, such as corporate insiders, can 
hurt investors’ confidence in the markets. The use of nonpublic information by insiders for profit-
seeking purposes is one such behavior. Nonetheless, financial literature indicates that nonpublic 
information is abused by some firm insiders (Lakonishok and Lee, 2001; Garfinkel et al. 2007; 
Huddart et al., 2007; Jagolinzer, 2009 among others). 
Although the abuse of nonpublic information for personal benefit by a firm’s insiders is an 
agency problem, the potential role of internal corporate governance mechanisms in mitigating such 
abuse of nonpublic information has not been fully explored in theory or practice. So far, external 
governance mechanisms, such as laws and regulations, have been relied upon to mitigate the abuse 
of nonpublic information. There is theoretical and empirical evidence, however, that external 
governance mechanisms can be substituted or complemented by various internal corporate 
governance mechanisms (Brickley and James, 1987; Hirshleifer and Thakor, 1994; Acharya et al., 
2011). Importantly, the shortage of studies about the role of internal governance mechanisms comes 
at a time when recent scandals and ongoing corporate governance concerns have made internal 
governance mechanisms, such as the board of directors, the center of policy debate and academic 
research (Adams et al., 2010). 
                                                          
1
 Arthur Levitt, “A Question of Integrity: Promoting Investor Confidence by Fighting Insider Trading,” address before 
the SEC Speaks conference, February 27, 1998. 
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This study investigates the impact some internal corporate governance mechanisms have on 
controlling the abuse of nonpublic information by firm insiders. Specifically, this study investigates 
whether monitoring firm management by the board of directors can augment regulation in 
mitigating informed insider trading by firms’ CEOs, the highest-level executives. Following the 
models, which link board characteristics to monitoring functions (Adams et al. 2010), I study the 
impact of some board characteristics such as board independence, CEO/Chairman duality, multiple 
directorship by independent directors and stock ownership by independent directors. Furthermore, I 
investigate the impact of SOX on CEOs’ trading, as well as on the role of the internal governance 
mechanisms in reduction of informed insider trading. SOX acts as an exogenous regulatory shock 
that contributes to the analysis of the interaction between internal governance mechanisms and 
external regulation of insider trading.  
Compared with the impact of the impact of external regulations, the impact of board 
monitoring as an internal governance mechanism on mitigating informed insider trading is expected 
to be significant for several reasons. First, monitoring by board members is exerted by parties who 
are well informed, have expertise, and are actively engaged in firm activities. Second, monitoring 
by the board of directors could be proactive rather than reactive. Unlike enforcement agencies, 
directors have vested interests in preventing the use of nonpublic information in insider trades. 
Third, the monitoring enforced by the board of directors is less constrained by regulatory obstacles 
and defensive mechanisms, when compared with monitoring by agencies such as the SEC.  
This study shows that CEOs earn significant abnormal returns on both buy and sell trades. 
Furthermore, the study suggests that board monitoring, as an internal governance mechanism, can 
reduce both the abnormal returns and the incidence of informed trading by firms’ CEOs. The results 
indicate that significance of the impact increases with the significance of the underlying nonpublic 
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information. The results also indicate that the impact of board monitoring is more significant and 
consistent for sell trades than it is for buy trades. 
The results also suggest that SOX reduces the abnormal return of buy and sell insider trades. 
In addition, the results show that SOX reduces the proportion of significantly informed trades in 
CEOs' trades. The results also suggest that some internal governance mechanisms became less 
effective after SOX (substitution effect), while others became more effective (complement effect). 
Overall, the results suggest that various internal governance mechanisms can be substituted for or 
be used to complement the regulations that aim to mitigate the use of nonpublic information in 
insider trades. Due to the different characteristics of buy and sell trades, however, the results for buy 
and sell trades are different for some mechanisms. Specifically, the results suggest that the impact 
of internal governance mechanisms is more pronounced for sell trades that are exposed to higher 
information asymmetry between insiders and outsiders than buy trades. The findings are significant 
both statistically and economically. 
There are few studies in the literature that are similar in scope to this study. Bettis et al. 
(2000) investigate the effectiveness of corporate compliance policies against informed insider 
trading and compare the effectiveness of such internal policies with that of external regulation. They 
find that corporate self-regulation is associated with a statistically and economically significant 
reduction in insider trading, but such internal regulations are not 100 percent effective. Furthermore, 
in a cross-country study, Durnev and Nain (2007) examine the effectiveness of insider trading 
restrictions in reducing private information trading and find that the effectiveness of the insider 
trading regulation depends on the severity of agency problem in the firm2. Another study that 
focuses on the monitoring role of the board of directors is Ravina and Sapienza (2010). Using 
                                                          
2
 They measure agency cost as the difference between control rights and cash flow rights of the largest shareholder. 
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insider trading data from 1986 to 2003, Ravina and Sapienza (2010) study the trading performance 
of independent directors and other firm executives and suggest that independent directors also earn 
significant abnormal returns on their purchase trades, with the return comparable to those earned by 
the firm’s executives. Ravina and Sapienza (2010) conclude that independent directors have 
adequate information to be able to monitor firm’s executives effectively. They suggest, however, 
that in firms with weak corporate governance, the gap between the information set available to a 
firm’s executives and that of independent directors widens, and the executives earn substantially 
higher abnormal returns on their insider trades than do independent directors.  The results of Ravina 
and Sapienza (2010) support the potential role of independent directors on mitigating informed 
trading by firm insiders.     
This study is different from other studies on the topic in several ways. First, among all 
internal governance mechanisms, the focus of this investigation is on the board of directors and the 
impact of several board characteristics in reducing informed insider trading. Furthermore, to get a 
clear view of the impact of the board monitoring, only trades by CEOs are studied, because CEOs 
are directly monitored by the board of directors. CEOs are among the most informed insiders and 
they earn higher abnormal returns on their trades than other insiders (Seyhun, 1986).  Second, 
unlike most previous studies that ignore sell trades3 (Garfinkel et al. 2007), this study considers both 
buy and sell trades and finds that in most cases, the impact of internal governance mechanisms is 
more pronounced on sell trades4. Third, while other studies have not paid adequate attention to the 
potential impact of SOX on insider trades, this study investigates the impact of SOX on the use of 
                                                          
3
 It is argued that there are several motivations for insider trades, such as need for liquidity, wealth diversification, and 
signaling. The need for liquidity and wealth diversification applies mostly to sell trades, since the granted stock options 
form a nontrivial portion of insiders’ wealth. However, insider buy trades occur mainly for investment and signaling 
purposes. 
4
 For suggested differences in the characteristics of buy and sell trades, see studies such as Kim and Verrecchia (1994), 
Baiman and Verrecchia (1996), and Cheng and Lo (2006). 
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nonpublic information in insider trades as well as on the role of internal governance mechanisms in 
mitigating informed trades. SOX is also used as an exogenous regulatory shock to test the 
hypothesis of substitution of internal and external governance mechanisms on insider trading issues. 
The findings of this study suggest that SOX has significantly reduced the abnormal returns and rate 
of CEOs’ informed insider trades.  
This study reviews the different views about insider trading, the development of insider 
trading regulation in the United States, and literature about the effectiveness of regulation in 
mitigating informed insider trading.   Moreover, the potential role of internal governance 
mechanisms in insider trading is investigated. Specifically, under a general framework for corporate 
governance, the law and regulations are considered as part of external governance mechanisms in 
reducing the conflict of interests between managers and shareholders, while the conduct of 
informed insider trading is considered as an agency problem, which originates from the conflict of 
interests between a firm’s insiders and outsiders. Since internal governance mechanisms pursue the 
narrowing of gap between interests of various stakeholders in a firm, the study investigates their 
impact on informed insider trading. This study limits itself to examining the impact of the board of 
directors among other internal governance mechanisms. Indeed, supervision by the board of 
directors not only can limit the opportunities that insiders have to profit by abusing nonpublic 
information (for example through lower information asymmetry), it also increases the probability 
that the abuse of nonpublic information is detected and punished. The study focuses on some 
characteristics of board of boards of directors, such as board independence and the duality of the 
CEO and the chairman of the board (hereafter, COB). In addition, the impact of some director 
characteristics, such as multiple directorships and stock ownership, on the effectiveness of 
independent directors is examined.  
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To measure the significance of nonpublic information incorporated in insider trades, this 
study measures the abnormal returns earned by the CEOs’ trades through various proxies. For 
instance, the abnormal return of an insider trade is considered as a proxy for the materiality of 
nonpublic information incorporated in the insider trade (Rogoff, 1964; Ravina and Sapienza, 2010). 
Furthermore, the significance of the underlying nonpublic information in each trade is estimated 
from the significance of the measured abnormal returns.  
The results are tested with a battery of robustness tests. The tests include using other 
methods to calculate abnormal returns, excluding records with unknown sector code, clustering for 
the sectors, excluding the data for 2002 (the year that SOX was implemented), controlling for the 
firms’ fixed effects, and testing for alternative explanations.  
The results of this study help to fill the void between studies on insider trading and those on 
internal governance mechanisms, and contribute to the literature in several ways. First, the study 
suggests that monitoring by the board can assist existing regulations in mitigating the abuse of 
nonpublic information trades by insiders. Second, it highlights the role of various aspects of board 
characteristics in the reduction of the abuse of nonpublic information. Third, it establishes the 
oversight of insider trading as part of the board’s monitoring role. Fourth, it sheds light on the 
interaction between external and internal governance mechanisms when it comes to controlling 
insider trading. Fifth, it adds to the literature about SOX and complements SOX-related research on 
its impact on corporate governance and insider trading. Finally, the study sheds light on managerial 
behavior in terms of handling nonpublic information under various regulatory and internal corporate 
governance settings.  
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This study can be extended in several ways. For example, other internal or even external 
corporate governance mechanisms can be investigated for their potential role in reducing the abuse 
of nonpublic information by insiders. In addition, trades by insiders other than CEOs can be studied. 
Comparing the results for various insiders with different levels of access to nonpublic information 
could be of interest. Furthermore, by focusing on firms’ characteristics, the impact of external and 
internal governance mechanisms can be compared for such characteristics as the size, industry and 
regulatory environment of the firm. Also, the relationship between insiders’ (for example, CEOs’) 
invested wealth in the firm and the effectiveness of internal governance mechanisms in reducing the 
abuse of nonpublic information can be investigated. 
This paper is organized as follows. Chapter 2 reviews the relevant literature and develops 
the hypotheses. Chapter 3 discusses the data and provides summary statistics. Chapter 4 lays out the 
applied methodology, presents the results, and tests their robustness. Chapter 5 concludes the study.  
 
2. Literature 
2.1. Insider Trading 
The SEC defines insider trading as follows: 
"Insider trading" is a term that most investors have heard and usually associate with 
illegal conduct. But the term actually includes both legal and illegal conduct. The legal 
version is when corporate insiders—officers, directors, and employees—buy and sell stock in 
their own companies. When corporate insiders trade in their own securities, they must report 
their trades to the SEC. Illegal insider trading refers generally to buying or selling a security, 
in breach of a fiduciary duty or other relationship of trust and confidence, while in possession 
of material, nonpublic information about the security.5  
                                                          
5
 http://www.sec.gov/answers/insider.htm. 
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Not all insider trades are based on nonpublic information. The insider trades, which are 
based on nonpublic information, are commonly called “informed,” “information-driven,” or 
“opportunistic” insider trading in the literature. Nonetheless, the incorporation of nonpublic 
information into trades by insiders is not observable to outside observers. Only cases that are 
detected, brought before a court or administrative tribunal, and proved to be based on nonpublic 
information are observable by the public. Such lack of observation has been an obstacle to studying 
illegal insider trading. The recognition of some trades as “informed insider trading” in the literature 
has been mainly based on estimations and do not have implications about legal status of individual 
trades.  
In this study, the terms “informed insider trading” and “information-driven insider trading” 
are used interchangeably to refer to trades that are likely to be based on nonpublic information, 
regardless of the significance of the nonpublic information or the breach of a duty by an insider. 
Moreover, the terms "more significantly informed insider trades" or " more significantly 
information-driven insider trades" are used to refer to trades, which are estimated to be based on 
more significant (or material) nonpublic information. 
In general, informed insider trades can take place in various ways. For example, insiders can 
use their nonpublic information to recognize mispricing and profit by trading the firm’s securities. 
Also, insiders can induce mispricing through incomplete or inaccurate information disclosures and 
take advantage of the created mispricing. Insiders can also sell or otherwise selectively disseminate 
their nonpublic information to others for personal benefit. 
The abnormal returns on insider trading that is done for personal benefit start with the 
information asymmetry between a firm’s insiders and outsiders. Such information asymmetry is an 
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inherent characteristic of a firm and is a result of the separation of ownership and control, and 
opacity of firms to their rival firms. In the absence of direct evidence of the use of nonpublic 
information, which is usually available only for cases that go for trial, researchers estimate the 
materiality of incorporated nonpublic information from ex-post abnormal returns. As Rogoff (1964) 
suggests, the abnormal return of an insider trade is associated with the significance (or materiality) 
of its underlying nonpublic information.   
The following section introduces the opposing academic views on insider trading and sets 
the stage for developing the hypotheses tested in this study. 
 
2.2. Views on Insider Trading 
Academicians have opposing views about the vices and virtues of insider trading and the 
appropriateness of associated regulations and penalties. Some economists and legal scholars argue 
that insiders should be allowed to trade the securities of their affiliated firms without constraints, 
and that the laws prohibiting informed insider trading should be revoked. These scholars argue that 
insider trading can transfer information to the markets more promptly and thereby benefit the 
general investor (Easterbrook, 1981). They also suggest that such insider trading not only increases 
the efficiency of capital markets by fostering the accuracy of stock prices, but also eliminates the 
need for many individuals to collect the same information through accelerated price discovery 
(Manne, 1966; Carlton and Fischel, 1983; Dye, 1984). They emphasize that adequate information 
may not be produced or disseminated in the absence of allowed informed insider trading (Demsetz, 
1969 and Hirshleifer, 1971). Furthermore, they argue that the new information brought by insider 
trades can reduce the risk and consequently, would increase asset prices and elevate real 
investments due to that reduced risk. It is also suggested that outsiders’ welfare may be higher at the 
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presence of free insider trading (Bhattacharya and Nicodano, 2001 and Medrano and Vives 2003). 
Fein (1992) suggests that insider trading is a victimless crime and hence enforcing insider trading 
restrictions is not cost effective. Manne (1966b) even proposes the use of unconstrained insider 
trading as a compensation mechanism and suggests that this method would not only reduce 
managerial salaries, but it would also make up for the shortcomings of conventional compensation 
methods.  
Conversely, the advocates for the prohibition of informed insider trading point to various 
harms to shareholders and other market participants by such trades. They argue that such trades are 
unfair to outsiders (Leland, 1992) and impose losses on opposing traders (Seyhun, 1986). It is also 
suggested that insider trades subject outside investors to moral hazard (Hirshleifer, 1971; Ross, 
1978) and adverse selection problems that eventually discourage investment in the firm and lower 
the firm’s value and its stock price (Manove, 1989; Ausubel, 1990; Fischer, 1992; Meulbroek, 
1992; Fishman and Hagerty, 1992; Chung and Li, 2003; Gunny et al., 2008). Furthermore, it is 
suggested that informed insider trading reduces market liquidity (Meulbroek, 1992) and decreases 
efficiency due to lower trading amounts and consequent sub-optimal risk sharing (Glosten, 1989; 
Maug, 1995, and 2002).  
There are studies that mention simultaneous benefits and harm to the markets by informed 
insider trading.  For example, in a theoretical study, Leland (1992) suggests several outcomes for 
allowed informed insider trading. He shows that when informed insider trading is allowed, stock 
prices are higher and the trades reflect information more efficiently. Leland (1992) also shows that 
as a consequence of allowed informed insider trading, expected real investment would rise, and 
both owners and insiders of investment projects would benefit, but markets would be less liquid and 
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outside investors would be hurt. Overall, Leland (1992) suggests that total welfare may change in 
either direction depending on the economic environment.  
From a public perspective, informed insider trading is regarded harmful for the shareholders. 
The continual evolution of insider trading regulation in many countries is due to this perception. 
The United States pioneered insider trading regulation, but the evolution of insider trading 
regulation is not limited to the U.S. Many other countries have moved in the same direction and 
have passed and enforced laws to prevent informed insider trading in their markets (Batacharya and 
Daouk, 2008).  
The following section is an overview of insider trading regulation in the United States. 
Evidence that indicates that regulation has not stopped the abuse of nonpublic information by 
insiders is reviewed. The section paves the way for the introduction of internal corporate 
governance mechanisms as factors that can mitigate the abuse of nonpublic information by insiders.  
 
2.3. Insider Trading Regulation 
In the aftermath of the stock market crash of 1929, federal legislation was introduced to 
regulate securities trading in the United States and, as a result of subsequent judicial decisions, 
served as the main basis for insider trading regulation. The Securities Act of 1933 (1933 Act), 
requires that any offer or sale of securities be registered, unless the offeror or seller (as applicable) 
can comply with an applicable exemption from registration. Through the registration process, the 
1933 Act requires that issuers publicly disclose information about themselves and the securities they 
issue. The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (1934 Act) was passed to regulate secondary trading. 
Section 10(b) of the 1934 Act outlaws manipulation and deception in connection with the purchase 
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or sale of a security. In addition, under Section 4 of the 1934 Act, the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) was created to regulate securities trading and the securities industry and to 
enforce federal securities law. Furthermore, Section 16(a) of the 1934 Act requires directors, 
officers, and stockholders of an issuer who directly or indirectly beneficially own more than 10 
percent of any registered security of the issuer to file statements with the SEC to report initial 
ownership and any further changes in ownership of those securities. According to Section 16(a), 
any change in ownership by an insider is required to be reported to the SEC. To prevent unfair use 
of nonpublic information by targeted officers, directors, and beneficial owners, Section 16(b) allows 
firms to recover any “short-swing profits” resulting from any matched purchase and sell trades 
occurring within a six-month period.  
Under and in accordance with Section 10(b) of the 1934 Act, the SEC adopted Rule 10b-5 in 
1942. Although, Rule 10b-5 was not initially used to regulate insider trading, it later became the 
primary enforcement tool for insider trading enforcement. The rule says:  
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means or 
instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any facility of any national 
securities exchange,  
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,  
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material fact 
necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under 
which they were made, not misleading, or  
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business that operates or would operate as 
a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.  
 
The direct regulation of “insider trading” under Rule 10b-5, however, is traceable to an 
opinion in an SEC administrative enforcement action from 1961, In re Cady, Roberts and Co., in 
which the SEC adopted the “disclose or abstain” principle. Under this rule, any insider who has 
material nonpublic information must either disclose the information before he trades or abstain from 
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trading. Based on this principle, the possession of material nonpublic information by an insider 
while trading is prohibited.  
The regulation of insider trading in the U.S. has been largely constructed through court 
decisions and SEC rule making. For instance, three key Supreme Court cases together establish the 
central principle of insider trading regulation under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5. In the first case, 
Chiarella v. United States (1980), the Supreme Court clarified the importance of the concept of 
“duty”  to the definition of an “insider” under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5. In the second key case, 
Dirks v. Securities and Exchange Commission (1983), the Court found that a person who trades on 
material nonpublic information received from an insider does not himself violate insider trading 
restrictions unless the information was conveyed improperly, for example, in violation of the 
insider’s known duty of trust and confidence. The third key Supreme Court ruling was United States 
v. O’Hagan (1997). This ruling endorsed a “misappropriation” theory of insider trading, under 
which any deceptive use of material nonpublic information to trade securities in breach of a duty of 
trust and confidence owed to the source of the information is considered a fraud.  
In more recent years, there has been more regulation. The Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 
1984 and the Insider Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act of 1988 set penalties for illegal 
insider trading up to three times the profit gained or the loss avoided from the illegal trading. The 
penalties are intended to increase the expected cost of conducting illegal insider trading.  
As an adjunct to insider trading regulation, the SEC adopted Regulation FD (Fair 
Disclosure) in 2000 to increase transparency and to address the problem of selective disclosure of 
information by publicly traded companies and other issuers. The SEC was concerned about the 
selective disclosure of material nonpublic information to market professionals (such as advance 
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warnings of earning results by issuers), as well as the potential resulting threats to market integrity 
arising from potential abuse of managerial information in favor of or against some analysts or 
investors. This piece of regulation, which was intended to foster the full and fair disclosure of 
information, mandated that when an issuer discloses material nonpublic information to certain 
individuals or entities (for example security analysts or institutional shareholders), the issuer must 
disclose the same information to the public promptly.  
In 2000, the SEC adopted Rules 10b5-1 and 10b5-2 to provide a clearer definition of insider 
trading and some of its elements. Rule 10b5-1 indicates that any purchase or sale of a security on 
the basis of “material nonpublic information” about the security or its issuer is forbidden if the 
trader is “aware” of such information at the time of a trade. Rule10b5-1 also provides several 
affirmative defenses against charges of (or exceptions to liability for) insider trading when an 
insider can demonstrate certain affirmative defenses. These affirmative defenses include trades 
under pre-existing plans, contracts, or instructions that were made in good faith. Furthermore, Rule 
10b5-2 clarifies the circumstances under which a duty of trust or confidence to another party may 
result in misappropriation liability.  
Another piece of legislation that has implications for insider trading, is the Sarbanes-Oxley 
Act of 2002 (SOX). In compliance with the requirements of Section 403 of SOX, the SEC amended 
Rule 16a-3(g). The rule shortened the required insider trading reporting time window from ten 
business days after the end of the month in which the trade occurs to two business days after the 
trade. In addition, the SEC required corporate insiders to file their reports electronically with the 
SEC and also required issuers to publish the information on their websites within one business day 
following the filing with the SEC as of June 30, 2003. These changes were made to reduce the 
degree of information asymmetry between insiders and outsiders. Furthermore, penalties for illegal 
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insider trading significantly increased after the passage of SOX, doubling the maximum term of 
imprisonment for insider trading convictions from 10 to 20 years and increasing fines from $1 
million to $5 million. In addition, Section 306(a) of SOX, entitled “Prohibition of Insider Trading 
During Pension Fund Blackout Periods” makes it illegal for any director or officer “to [directly or 
indirectly] purchase, sell or otherwise acquire or transfer any equity security of the issuer during 
any pension plan blackout period with respect to such equity security, if the director or executive 
officer acquired the equity security in connection with his or her service or employment as a 
director or executive officer.”6 Section 306(a) also requires issuers to notify their directors and 
officers about pension fund blackout periods that may affect them. 
Under and in connection with SOX, new listing requirements were adopted by the NYSE 
and NASDAQ that require firms to have boards with a majority of independent directors as well as 
entirely independent compensation, nomination, and governance committees. In addition, they 
required that the audit committee have a minimum of three members and consist entirely of 
independent directors. Also, each member of the audit committee must be financially literate and at 
least one member of the audit committee must be a financial expert or the company must disclose 
that it does not have such an expert and why.  
 
2.4. Effectiveness of Regulation as an External Corporate Governance Mechanism  
Although the law and regulations have been relied upon as the main mechanisms for 
limiting informed insider trades, their effectiveness in preventing the use of nonpublic information 
by insiders is an open question. Previous academic research found evidence that can be interpreted 
                                                          
6
 Section 306(a)(1) of SOX. 
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as the relative ineffectiveness of the regulation in mitigating the use of nonpublic information by 
insiders. It may be argued that regulations are not intended to prevent entire informed insider trades; 
rather, the regulation only targets trades that are based on “material” nonpublic information used in 
violation of an identified duty of trust and confidence. Such an argument implies the limitations of 
regulation in detecting and preventing informed insider trades. These limitations of the regulations 
would encourage us to look for other mechanisms that can compensate for the shortcomings of the 
law and regulation. If we assume that informed insider trades are undesirable, mechanisms that can 
prevent informed insider trades with more precision and at a lower cost than insider trading 
regulation would be highly desirable.  
Previous studies have documented that corporate insiders earn significant abnormal returns 
on their trades (Jaffe, 1974; Finnerty, 1976a, 1976b; Penman, 1982; Seyhun, 1986, and 1998; 
Rozeff and Zaman, 1988; Lin and Howe, 1990; Damodaran and Liu, 1993; Jeng et al., 1999; Jeng et 
al., 2003; Garfinkel et al., 2007; Huddart et al., 2007; Jagolinzer, 2009, Ravina and Sapienza, 2010, 
Anderson et al., 2011)7. Seyhun (1986) finds that even uninformed outsiders were able to earn 
abnormal returns by imitating trades conducted by insiders. According to the semi-strong form of 
the efficient market hypothesis, these results imply that nonpublic information is incorporated into 
some insider trades, since the efficient market theories indicate that trades conducted by insiders 
should, on average, yield zero abnormal return if they are not based on nonpublic information. 
The evidence about the incorporation of nonpublic information in insider trades is not 
limited to the abnormal returns earned by insiders. Several studies suggest that trades by insiders 
have significant predicting power for various corporate events such as merger and acquisition 
                                                          
7
 Estimates of insider’s abnormal returns in these studies range from 3 percent to 30 percent for holding periods from 
eight months to three years. 
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activity (Meulbroek, 1992; Seyhun, 1990), bankruptcy (Seyhun and Bradley, 1997), accounting 
frauds (Summers and Sweeney, 1998), accounting standard changes (Larcker et al., 1983; 
Odaiyappa and Nainar, 1992), dividend initiations (John and Lang, 1991), seasoned equity offerings 
(Karpoff and Lee, 1991), share repurchase activities (Lee et al., 1992) and future stock returns 
(Meulbroek, 1992; Lakonishok and Lee, 2001). 
Other studies document evidence on insiders’ market timing, strategic trading, and 
information manipulation (Penman 1982; Elliot et al., 1984; Seyhun, 1988; Noe, 1999; Lakonishok 
and Lee, 2001; Jenter, 2005; Cheng and Lo, 2006; Geczy and Yan, 2006; Billings, 2007; and 
Jagolinzer, 2009). In general, these studies show that corporate insiders not only time their trades 
around an important corporate event, but also manipulate corporate events in order to make a profit 
on their trading. For instance, Elliot et al. (1984) find that insiders increase purchases and decrease 
sales in the 12-month period before an extreme earnings hike.8 Seyhun (1986) shows that insiders 
purchase stock of their own firm before abnormal stock price increases and sell before abnormal 
stock price declines. Seyhun (1986) also finds that not only are insiders well informed about the 
value of their information, but their trade volume is proportional to the perceived value of their 
information. For instance, CEOs earn higher abnormal returns than other insider traders in a firm. 
Similarly, Noe (1999) shows that managers sell more shares after good news is released than they 
do after bad news is released, while they buy more shares after bad news than they do after good 
news. Huddart et al. (2003) find that insiders sell more stock in the year before a firm experiences a 
shock in consecutive quarterly earnings increase. Cheng and Lo (2006) find that managers increase 
the number of bad news forecasts in advance of their purchase activities and that such an increase is 
more pronounced when CEOs trade. Cheng and Lo (2006) also suggest that managers’ market 
                                                          
8
 They find little evidence, however, about increased sales in advance of extreme earnings decrease. 
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timing is more successful for buy trades than for sell trades and attribute that to a higher probability 
of litigation risk for sell trades. Geczy and Yan (2006) find that market makers affiliated with the 
brokers who are used by insiders post more aggressive ask quotes compared with their peers when 
insiders trade. Billings (2007) finds that insiders selling shares in advance of significant price 
declines delays the release of poor earning news. Marin and Oliver (2008) show that insiders’ stock 
sales peak several months before a large drop in stock price and insiders' purchases peak in the 
month before a large jump in stock price. Also, Ravina and Sapienza (2010) find that independent 
directors and executives exhibit excellent timing skills which are not arbitrary.  
Another factor that decreases the effectiveness of regulation against informed insider trading 
is the existence of regulatory exceptions. These exceptions allow insiders to profit from their 
nonpublic information without violating the law. As a good example, Rule 10b5-1, which protects 
insiders' pre-planned trades from litigation, seems to enable insiders to do strategic trading 
(Jagolinzer, 2009). Jagolinzer (2009) finds that participating insiders’ sales systematically follow 
positive and precede negative firm performance. He also finds that such trades generate abnormal 
forward-looking returns larger than those earned by nonparticipating insiders. Rule 10b5-1 created a 
possible loophole for insiders by letting them cancel planned trades so they could avoid loss based 
on their nonpublic information without violating insider trading regulations (Fried, 2003; 
Jagolinzer, 2009). Likewise, Yermack (2009) studies large charitable stock gifts by chairmen and 
CEOs of public companies and finds that these gifts, which are not subject to insider trading 
regulation (because they do not constitute sales of securities), often occur before sharp declines in 
their firms’ stock prices. Yermack (2009) finds that such timing effect is more significant when 
executives donate shares to their own family foundations. He also suggests that some CEOs 
fraudulently backdate stock gifts to increase their personal income benefits and that CEOs’ family 
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foundations hold donated stocks for long periods instead of diversifying their portfolio so that CEOs 
can continue to enjoy their voting power.  
Inefficient enforcement is another reason for the ongoing abuse of nonpublic information in 
insider trades (Fernandes and Ferreira, 2009). Durnev and Nain (2007) show the importance of 
enforcement efficiency by finding that the amount of private information trading decreases after the 
first enforcement of insider trading laws, rather than after the introduction of the law. Likewise, in a 
cross-country study, Bhattacharya and Daouk (2009) suggest that it is not the introduction of insider 
trading laws that changes the cost of equity in a country, but the first prosecution that significantly 
reduces the cost of equity. They suggest that the regulation is especially ineffective in mitigating 
gray trades, which are difficult to be judged legal or illegal.  
Given the shortcomings of the existing regulation and enforcement mechanisms in 
preventing informed insider trading, many companies have increasingly adopted internal insider 
trading policies, known as compliance policies. Seyhun (1992) documents that as of November 
1990, about 25 percent of companies explicitly had cautioned their employees against insider 
trading. Bettis et al. (2000) documented that by late 1996, 92 percent of firms they studied had 
adopted some type of insider trading policy. Such policies, which are mainly intended to protect a 
company against liabilities posed by its employees’ insider trading, can be in the form of a general 
ban on trading or tipping on material nonpublic information, allowed trading windows, blackout 
periods,9 or pre-clearance requirements. Also, in some firms, compliance policies prohibit their 
                                                          
9
 Indeed, blackout periods ban trading by a group of insiders during a window that is otherwise open. A compliance 
officer, who supervises the compliance with internal insider trading rules, may announce a blackout period if there is 
nonpublic information about the firm that might affect share price. In addition, the blackout period may be announced 
before filing forms such as an 8-K, an amended annual report 10-K, or an amended 10-Q.  Also, in some firms, insiders 
go through a pre-clearance procedure by the compliance department before they conduct a trade. Thus, the compliance 
officer determines whether the employee who plans to trade is aware of any material nonpublic information. 
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insiders from engaging in some activities such as short sales10, trading derivatives, purchasing 
covered securities on margin,11 engaging in zero-cost collars or forward sale contracts, which allow 
the employee to continue to own the covered security without the full risk and reward of ownership. 
Some companies also require that any equity security purchased in the open market must be held for 
a minimum amount of time (for example six months).  
But, the effectiveness of compliance policies in deterring informed insider trading is not 
clear. Although Bettis et al. (2000) find that internal compliance policies reduce the rate and 
abnormal return of insider trades, they suggest that insider trading still occurs during blackout 
periods and the trades still earn abnormal returns, although they are lower than the abnormal return 
earned by trades made during allowed trading windows. Bettis et al. (2000) attribute the occurrence 
of trades in blackout periods to partial ineffectiveness of internal regulation at the company level or 
considerable permissions granted to insiders to trade during blackout periods. Overall, they suggest 
that internal corporate policies provide benefits to shareholders beyond what is provided by the 
external regulation12. This observation supports the role of internal governance mechanisms in 
reducing the use of nonpublic information in insider trades and supports the hypothesis laid out in 
this study as well as the obtained results.     
Despite the potential for compliance policies to limit the abuse of nonpublic information, 
another view argues that compliance policies merely provide legal protection for the firm and the 
firm’s insiders without having any significant effect on insider trading. Under this view, these 
internal regulations make it more difficult for the SEC to prove insiders’ reckless activities 
(Steinberg and Fletcher, 1994; Horowitz and Bitar, 1998). The view indicates that the trading 
                                                          
10
 Section 16(c) of the Exchange Act also prohibits directors and officers from engaging in short sales. 
11
 This refers to purchasing a company's securities by borrowing money from stockbrokers to fund the purchase. 
12
 They also indicate that the reduction of incidence and abnormal return are more pronounced for insider sales than 
purchases. 
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policies appear to be a public relations contrivance, rather than an effective tool in reducing 
informed trading by corporate insiders.  
The high cost of informed insider trading, along with the indication that current regulation is 
not fully effective suggests a need for other solutions to the problem of informed insider trading. 
The literature indicates, implicitly and explicitly, that internal corporate governance mechanisms 
can affect the abuse of nonpublic information in insider trades. Mainly, internal corporate 
governance mechanisms can reduce the opportunities for abuse of nonpublic information by 
reducing the information asymmetry between insiders and the markets, by empowering regulation 
and enforcement in detecting information-driven trades, and by punishing insiders. Internal 
corporate governance mechanisms can operate in parallel with external governance mechanisms in 
reducing the interest gap between insiders and outsiders.  
To investigate the role of internal governance mechanisms in reducing the abuse of 
nonpublic information by insiders, this study analyzes the role of the board of directors in 
monitoring firms’ highest-ranking executives, CEOs. Studying the impact of board monitoring on 
the trading behavior of firms’ CEOs provides a clearer picture of the role boards play as the firm’s 
most important internal governance mechanism. The focus on CEOs is important since the CEO is 
the most informed individual in a firm who is not normally monitored by other managers. 
Furthermore, due to CEOs’ power inside the firm, it is not generally expected that compliance 
policies have a significant impact on their trading behavior. For lower managerial levels, insider 
trades are monitored and checked by compliance officers and possibly by senior managers.  
It is worth noting that the focus on the board of directors does not negate the possibility that 
other internal governance mechanisms can be effective in reducing the abuse of nonpublic 
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information by corporate insiders. A potential extension to this study would be to look at the role of 
other internal governance mechanisms in preventing informed insider trading. 
 
2.5. Corporate Governance: Internal and External Mechanisms  
Corporate governance has been defined in various ways. For example, Shleifer and Vishny 
(1997) suggest that corporate governance is a framework in which suppliers of capital to 
corporations are assured about their investments. Gillan and Starks (1998) suggest that corporate 
governance is a system of laws, rules and factors that control a company’s operation. Zingales 
(1998) defines corporate governance as a complex set of constraints that shape the ex-post 
bargaining over the quasi-rents generated by a firm.  
 In general, the mechanisms that are in place to reduce the gap between the interests of a 
firm’s principals and those of the firm's agents are called corporate governance mechanisms. 
Corporate governance mechanisms are usually categorized into two main groups: internal and 
external. Internal corporate governance mechanisms include, but are not limited to, the board of 
directors (including its role, structure, and incentives), managerial incentives, capital structure, 
bylaw/charter provisions, and internal control systems. External governance mechanisms include, 
but are not limited to, laws and regulations, capital markets, markets for corporate control, labor 
markets, product markets, capital market analysts, markets for accounting, financial and legal 
services, and private sources of external oversight.   
It is conceivable that internal and external governance mechanisms can substitute for or 
complement each other, since both have the same goal: to reduce the gap between the interests of 
insiders and outsiders. The literature has documented the general relationship between internal and 
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external governance mechanisms. For example, Brickley and James (1987) suggest that the market 
for takeovers and boards of directors are substitute mechanisms in controlling managerial behavior. 
Hirshleifer and Thakor (1994) refer to the interplay between the internal mechanisms for corporate 
control (such as board actions) and the external mechanisms for corporate control (such as 
acquirers’ actions) and suggest that internal and external monitoring can be either substitutes or 
complements. 
As an agency problem, insider trading is also affected by internal and external corporate 
governance mechanisms. Both internal and external governance mechanisms affect factors that 
influence insiders’ decisions in conducting trades. Information asymmetry between a firm’s insiders 
and outsiders is one of these factors13. The literature suggests that stronger internal corporate 
governance decreases the information asymmetry between principals and agents (Wruck, 1989; 
Hertzel and Smith, 1993; Hertzel et al., 2002). It is also documented that higher financial statement 
quality, in terms of communicating information with outsiders and more precise analyst 
investigations reduces the association between insider trades and their subsequent stock returns 
(Frankel and Li, 2004).  It is also suggested that annual earnings announcements convey more 
information in countries with better enforced insider trading laws and those countries with strong 
investor protection institutions (DeFond et al., 2007).  
                                                          
13
 Previous studies show that information asymmetry is the leading factor in abnormal return on informed insider trades 
(Rogers and Stocken 2005; Huddart et al. 2007) and is the main driver for insiders to take advantage of their nonpublic 
information. Information asymmetry peaks around corporate events and earning announcements, mergers, and 
acquisitions (Kim and Verrecchia 1994; Skinner 1991; and Lee et al. 1992). The price-taking model of Grossman and 
Stiglitz (1976) and the imperfect competition model of Kyle (1985) also predict a positive association between 
information asymmetry and abnormal returns of insider trades. These models also indicate that in firms with weak 
corporate governance, which generally show significant information asymmetry between insiders and outsiders, trades 
conducted by insiders are linked to abnormal returns.  
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Stronger corporate governance also boosts the effectiveness of existing insider trading 
regulation through more effective monitoring and enforcement. Durnev and Nain (2007) suggest 
that insider trading regulation is less effective in reducing private information trading when 
corporate governance is weaker. 
In addition to adjusting the level of information asymmetry, internal corporate governance 
mechanisms influence insiders’ decisions on using nonpublic information by increasing the 
probability they will be detected and punished. Indeed, stronger governance reduces the expected 
payoff of informed insider trading. As the costs of insider trading become sufficiently high and 
exceed the expected payoff from trading, insiders abstain from trading (Piotroski and Roulstone 
2007). 
The following section reviews the impact of the board of directors has as an internal 
governance mechanism. The impact is traced to various board characteristics that affect board 
supervisory role and an insider's decision to trade on insider information.  
 
2.6. Board of Directors  
The board of directors is arguably the most important internal governance mechanism. It has 
also become the center of debate concerning governance and the focus of academic research as a 
result of corporate scandals in the past two decades. In his presidential address to the American 
Finance Association in 1993, financial economist Michael Jensen stated “The board of directors, at 
the apex of internal control systems, is charged with advising and monitoring management and has 
the responsibility to hire, fire, and compensate the senior management team”. Similarly, in a 
comprehensive survey study on corporate governance, Gillan (2006) states that “…many view the 
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board of directors as the lynchpin of corporate governance”. Boone et al. (2007) state that the board 
of directors is at the center of attempts to improve corporate governance by firms’ shareholder 
advocates. 
 From a legal point of view, the board of directors has two key fiduciary duties. The first, 
which is known as the “duty of care,” typically requires that directors act with the same care as a 
“reasonably prudent man” would exercise under similar circumstances (although the standard of 
conduct and liability vary somewhat from state to state). The second, known as the “duty of 
loyalty,” requires that directors not engage in activities contrary to the best interests of the 
corporation. Among other things, the duty of loyalty requires procedural safeguards and standards 
of fairness in cases of a conflict of interest between the director and the organization.  
This study focuses on the boards’ duties of care and loyalty in overseeing the business and 
affairs of the corporation-specially, by limiting the abuse of nonpublic information by CEOs. 
Moreover, the effectiveness of the board of directors is examined as an alternative to regulations. As 
mentioned before, there are several important reasons to focus on the board of directors among 
other internal corporate governance mechanisms. First, the board of directors is frequently referred 
to as the most important internal corporate governance mechanism. Because of its high position in a 
firm, the board is less likely than other internal governance mechanisms to be manipulated by 
insiders. The effectiveness of a board in limiting the abuse of nonpublic information, however, 
depends on several characteristics of the board as well as the balance of power between the board 
and the firm’s management, particularly the CEO. There are models that link board characteristics 
to boards’ monitoring functions. Such models have proved to be robust and widely consistent with 
subsequent empirical results (Adams et al., 2010). Moreover, the board’s impact on insider trading 
runs through the same channels, which carry the impact of regulation. This parallel functioning 
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allows a comparison between the effectiveness of the regulation and that of internal governance 
mechanisms. For example, both the regulation and the board of directors are supposed to decrease 
information asymmetry between a firm’s insiders and outsiders and consequently reduce the 
expected benefits of informed insider trading for insiders. It is suggested in the literature that the 
board of directors reduces information asymmetry between a firm’s managers and owners (or 
between insiders and outsiders) and this effect is more pronounced at the presence of independent 
directors (Wruck, 1989, Hertzel and Smith, 1993, Hertzel et al, 2002). The monitoring capabilities 
of board of directors have been theoretically shown in several studies (e.g. Williamson, 1975; Calvo 
and Wellisz, 1979; Holmstrom, 1982; Kofman and Lawarree, 1993; and Tirole, 1986, 1992). In 
addition, there are many empirical studies that document the monitoring role of board of directors 
(Fama, 1980; Fama and Jensen, 1983; Gilson, 1989; Srinivasan, 2005; Shivdasani and Yermack, 
1999). 
 Compared with external (that is, laws and regulations) and internal governance 
mechanisms, the board’s impact on limiting informed insider trading is expected to be significant 
for several reasons. First, board monitoring is conducted and enforced by directors who are well 
informed about their firm and information flow inside the firm (Ravina and Sapienza, 2010). Board 
members are in a position to obtain information about almost any issue much more easily than 
anybody else could. Second, directors could gain personal benefits from preventing information-
driven trades and consequently are expected to be proactive in preventing or detecting informed 
insider trading. The directors’ payoff from outside the firm shapes their motivations as well. In 
particular, independent directors’ external payoffs outweigh their payoff from inside the firm and 
hence provide a motivation for them to prevent wrongdoings by managers (Fama, 1980; Fama and 
Jensen, 1983; Gilson, 1989; Srinivasan, 2005; Shivdasani and Yermack, 1999). Fich and Shivdasani 
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(2007) show that directors who serve in firms that are subject to class-action lawsuits experience a 
drop in other seats they hold. They also find that the drop in gaining extra board seats grows with 
the severity of fraud allegations and with the responsibility of a director in monitoring fraud (for 
example directors who serve on audit committees). Directors have been also held liable for fraud 
occurred in their firms (Adams et al., 2010). Conversely, supervisory agencies, such as the SEC, 
may be reactive, rather than proactive, in their monitoring activities so that their staff may conduct 
in-depth oversight only when triggered by a suspected violation. Third, while the effectiveness of 
the regulation is greatly dependent upon its enforcement, internal corporate governance mechanisms 
are not dependent on other enforcement mechanisms. Also, boards are not constrained by legal 
procedures and red tape to the extent that regulatory agencies, such as the SEC, are in their 
monitoring activities (Steinberg and Fletcher, 1996; Horowitz and Bitar, 1998). Boards have such 
levers as compensation and hire/fire decisions to discipline CEOs. Such disciplining power spills 
over from top to bottom of the managerial hierarchy. Fourth, boards can eliminate opportunities for 
informed insider trading by reducing the information asymmetry between insiders and the market. 
The reduction of information asymmetry is usually achieved through prompt and accurate 
information releases to the markets.  
The following section discusses some of the board characteristics that have been linked to 
board monitoring abilities.  
 
2.6.1. Board Independence  
Generally, directors are categorized into two groups: inside and outside directors (Adams et 
al., 2010). Inside directors are directors who are full-time employees of the firm, while outside 
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directors are those whose primary employment is not with the firm. Among outside directors, those 
with some business relationship with the firm are known as affiliated or gray directors, while those 
with no material connection to the firm (other than a board seat) are known as independent directors 
(See Appendix G for details provided by Thomson Reuters).  
Another categorization divides the directors into two groups: dependent and independent. 
Although there is no consensus among scholars about the definition of director independence, an 
independent director is generally defined as someone who has never worked at the company or any 
of its subsidiaries or consultants, is not related to any of the key employees, and has not worked for 
a major supplier or customer of the firm. Independent directors are the focus of this study as they 
are postulated in the literature to be the group that is most highly motivated to monitor the CEO.  
The presence of independent directors is commonly associated with higher efficiency of the 
board in fulfilling its monitoring function14 (Dunn, 1987; Rosenstein and Wyatt, 1990), even though 
the impact of independence on firm performance is mixed. Not only do independent directors bring 
diversified sets of experience and expertise to a firm, they are more highly motivated than inside 
directors in monitoring the management. That motivation is thought to stem from the independent 
directors’ balance of internal and external payoffs. The literature suggests that the weight of 
directors’ external benefits, such as reputation, is much higher than their benefits from inside the 
firm (Fama, 1980; Fama and Jensen, 1983; Gilson, 1989; and Srinivasan, 2005)15. Fama (1980) 
suggests that reputation, as an external payoff for independent directors, is an important incentive 
for directors to act in their principal’s interests. Hermalin and Weisbach (1998), suggest that more 
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 Another main function of directors is advising the management, particularly the CEO. 
15
 For instance, Srinivasan (2005) suggests that the occurrence of accounting restatements increases the likelihood of 
losing seat by independent board members both in restating firm and other firms they may serve as a director. 
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independent boards provide higher levels of monitoring and that they can afford to be tougher with 
marginally performing incumbent CEOs. Shivdasani and Yermack (1999) suggest that more 
independent boards are more likely to monitor management aggressively and remove poorly 
performing CEOs. In the same vein, Weisbach (1988) suggests that CEO turnover is more sensitive 
to firm performance in firms whose boards are dominated by outside directors than other firms. 
Also, Raheja (2005) and Harris and Raviv (2008) developed theoretical models that suggest that 
optimal boards employ larger numbers of outside directors. Boone et al. (2007) find that the 
proportion of outsiders on the board will be negatively related to the CEO’s influence and positively 
related to constraints on the CEO’s influence. Other studies find that independent boards are 
instrumental in reducing information asymmetry by having management comply with accounting 
rules and produce more accurate financial statements (Dechow et al., 1996; Anderson et al., 2003, 
Farber, 2004; and Sengupta, 2004).  
One question that may arise about the effectiveness of independent directors in mitigating 
informed insider trading is whether independent directors have access to sufficient information 
about the firm to monitor insider trading behavior. Ravina and Sapienza (2010) find that 
independent directors are well informed about their associated firms and are thus able to monitor 
insiders effectively. As an indication of the adequacy of information independent directors have, 
Ravina and Sapienza (2010) show that independent directors earn substantial abnormal returns 
when they trade their own company’s stock, an indicator of access to nonpublic information. The 
abnormal returns earned by independent directors are comparable to those earned by the firm’s 
executives. This suggests that the gap between the information set of independent directors and that 
of managers narrows as corporate governance quality improves within a firm.  
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The importance of board independence has resulted in regulatory pressure to have more 
independent directors on boards. The NYSE and the NASDAQ require a majority of independent 
directors on the boards of listed firms. Furthermore, they require that the audit, compensation, and 
nominating committees be comprised only of independent directors. SOX also contains several 
requirements that have increased the demand and workload for independent directors.  
Given the above, it is expected that there is a negative association between board 
independence, as measured by the proportion of independent directors to board size, and the abuse 
of nonpublic information by insiders, specifically CEOs, who are directly monitored by boards of 
directors. The association is caused by the impact independent directors have on information 
asymmetry between a firm’s insiders and outsiders, and more effective monitoring of insider trades, 
which leads to higher expected cost of the abuse of nonpublic information by a firm’s insiders. The 
spread of the abuse of nonpublic information can be measured by the abnormal return earned on 
insider trades and the frequency (or intensity) of such trades.  
2.6.2. CEO/Chairman Duality 
The separation of the CEO and chairman of the board positions (duality) is another factor 
that can impact the monitoring ability of a board. It has been suggested that the separation of these 
positions provides a checking mechanism on CEOs' activities16. Fama and Jensen (1983) suggest 
that agency cost is reduced by the separation of decision management from decision control. In his 
presidential address to American Finance Association, financial economist Michael Jensen 
encouraged separating the two titles to strengthen the board's monitoring role. In a theoretical 
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 The results on the impact of duality on firm performance are mixed (Brickley et. al, 1997)  
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setting, Adams et al. (2010) show that CEOs who also hold board chairmanships have more 
influence over corporate decision making and may reduce the board’s monitoring power.  
The empirical evidence also confirms the perceived impact of the duality of the CEO and the 
chairman of the board (COB). Hermalin and Weisbach (1991, 1998) suggest that the duality may be 
a sign of entrenchment against mechanisms that hinder the CEO from forbidden private benefits. 
Goyal and Park (2002) suggest that the sensitivity of CEO turnover to performance is lower when 
titles are combined. Anderson et al. (2003) find that earning announcements are more informative in 
firms where the board is more independent and in firms where the CEO and chairman positions are 
not held by the same person.  
Given the impact of duality on the effectiveness of the board’s monitoring role, this study 
hypothesizes that separating the CEO and COB positions will reduce the incidence of insider 
trading and abnormal returns by firms’ CEOs.  
2.6.3. Multiple Directorships 
Although independent directors are suggested to be more effective monitors of firms' CEOs, 
not all independent directors have the same effectiveness. One factor that affects independent 
directors' monitoring ability is the amount of time and energy a director allocates to the monitoring 
functions. The issue is particularly critical in the case of independent directors, since they shoulder a 
bigger portion of the board’s monitoring function. Multiple directorships, measured as the number 
of directorships held by a single director, is a control variable for independent directors in this 
study.  
The number of directorships held by a single director can be considered as a proxy for the 
amount of time and energy a director allocates to the firm. There are conflicting views about the 
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impact a director holding multiple directorships has on the monitoring efficiency of the board 
directors. The “busy director hypothesis” suggests that directors with too many directorships are 
associated with weaker corporate governance. The theory also suggests that too many directorships 
could lower the monitoring effectiveness of outside directors (Core et al., 1999; Shivdasani and 
Yermack, 1999). These studies do not, however, define how many directorships is too many. 
Beasley (1996) suggests that the probability of accounting fraud in a firm is positively associated 
with the average number of directorships held by outside directors. Shivdasani and Yermack (1999) 
suggest that busy directors are more likely to be appointed to the board when the CEO has more 
influence on the nominating process. Fich and Shivdasani (2006) find that CEO turnover is less 
sensitive to firm performance in firms with busy directors. Adams and Ferreira (2008) find that 
busier directors are more likely to have attendance problems at board meetings. In the same vein, 
Adams et al. (2010) theoretically show that less busy directors devote more time to a board than 
their busier counterparts. Overall, the preponderance of evidence indicates that busy directors 
weaken corporate governance. 
Nevertheless, one study finds the converse. Ferris et al. (2003) suggest that busy directors 
are as effective as less busy directors at their monitoring functions. They find no evidence that 
directors with multiple directorships shirk their responsibilities or that their presence on a board is 
associated with a greater likelihood of securities fraud litigation. Ferris et al. (2003) find that 
directors on multiple boards serve on more committees and attend more committee meetings. They 
suggests that the number of directorships is associated with the quality of previous board service, as 
measured by a firm’s financial performance (this view is called “reputation hypothesis”) and 
therefore directors with multiple directorships are not necessarily less effective than their peers with 
fewer number of directorships.   
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Based on the “busy director hypothesis,” it is expected that independent directors with 
multiple directorships are associated with higher abnormal return and higher rates of CEOs’ 
informed trades. In contrast, based on the “reputation hypothesis,” it is expected that multiple 
directorship is associated with lower levels of abnormal return and lower rates of CEO trades. 
2.6.4. Director Ownership 
Equity ownership is another factor that can influence the effectiveness of directors in 
achieving their duties. As suggested by Ravina and Sapienza (2010) independent directors also earn 
abnormal returns on their trades. Therefore, this study investigates equity ownership by independent 
directors to see if such ownership has an impact on the effectiveness of CEO monitoring by 
independent directors.  
Higher equity ownership by independent directors can align their interests with those of 
shareholders and empower them toward more effective monitoring of CEOs. As such, it is expected 
that higher ownership level by independent directors is associated with lower levels of the abuse of 
nonpublic information by CEOs in the form of informed insider trading. On the other hand, higher 
ownership by independent directors could encourage them to pursue profit-seeking trading based on 
their nonpublic information (Ravina and Sapienza, 2010). If independent directors conduct insider 
trading based on nonpublic information, they may not be effective monitors of CEOs. Therefore, 
this study investigates stock ownership by independent directors as an influential factor on the 
monitoring effectiveness of independent directors.   
Given the results of previous studies that confirm the role of boards in reducing agency costs 
through lower information asymmetry and higher monitoring and enforcement abilities, it is 
expected that abnormal return and rate of informed insider trades by CEOs decrease with stronger 
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internal corporate governance. Stronger corporate governance is defined here as higher proportions 
of independent directors and the separation of the CEO and the COB positions. The first hypothesis 
is: 
H1: Stronger board monitoring, measured by higher board independence and the separation of 
the CEO and the COB positions, is associated with lower abnormal return and incidence (rate) 
of insider trades.  
Also, the impact of multiple directorship, measured as the average number of directorships 
held by independent directors, and stock ownership, measured as the total stock ownership by 
independent directors on a board, is investigated. 
2.7. The Impact of SOX 
Another contribution of this study is investigating the impact of SOX on informed insider 
trading as well as the potential role of the internal corporate governance mechanisms, which are 
studied here. SOX is part of regulations, which are commonly categorized as external governance 
mechanisms (Gillan, 2006). In general, SOX has several objectives.  These objectives include (1) 
strengthening the independence of auditing firms, (2) improving the quality and transparency of 
financial statements and corporate disclosure, (3) enhancing corporate governance, (4) improving 
the objectivity of research, and (5) strengthening the enforcement of the federal securities laws17. 
These objectives affect the expected costs and benefits of conducting informed insider trading by 
firms' insiders directly or indirectly.  
                                                          
17
 The Practitioner’s Guide to the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, Volume1, American Bar Association, 2004. 
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As mentioned before, SOX triggered some requirements by the SEC regarding insider 
trades. Since SOX, insiders are required to report their trades within two business days of the 
trading day rather than by the 10th day of the month following the trading month. SOX reduced the 
information asymmetry between insiders and outsiders of firms by reducing the reporting time. 
Consequently, profitable opportunities that would arise due to information asymmetry are reduced 
due to the new reporting requirements. Moreover, SOX increased the penalties for the violators of 
the insider trading regulations. The increased penalties give rise to higher expected costs of abuse of 
nonpublic information by firm insiders. The higher expected costs of informed insider trades are 
expected to result in lower expected profit of such trades and consequently, lower incidences (rates) 
of informed trades.  
 Moreover, considering the impact of SOX on information asymmetry and expected costs of 
violation of insider trading laws, it is expected that the impact of internal governance mechanisms 
in reducing information asymmetry and increasing the expected cost of informed insider trades for 
insiders is less pronounced after SOX than it is before SOX. Some of the deficiencies of laws and 
regulations that would be compensated by stronger internal governance mechanisms (substitute 
effect), are eliminated by SOX. The potential complementary impact of SOX remains. In terms of 
the interaction of SOX with previous regulation, it can be said that weaker boards with less 
monitoring could find that SOX is a substitute while stronger boards will find SOX a complement 
to their efforts. The second hypothesis is as follows: 
H2: SOX reduced the abnormal return and rate of insider trades. Also, the impact of stronger 
board monitoring on insider trades is less pronounced in the post-SOX era than in the pre-SOX 
era. 
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3. Data   
3.1. Insider Trading Report System 
Currently, ownership and trades by directors, officers and beneficiary owners with at least 
10 percent ownership are required to be reported to the SEC through Forms 3, 4, 5, or 144. Form 3 
is an initial statement of beneficial ownership for all officers, directors, and holders of 10 percent or 
more of an issuer’s public equity and is filed when the issuer is registering its equity securities for 
the first time or, if later, when the person first becomes a officer, director, or holder of 10 percent or 
more of an issuer’s public equity. Form 4, which typically is the most important form to report 
insider trading, reports changes in an insider’s ownership position, whether such change is a 
purchase, sale, option grant, option exercise, gift, or any other transaction. Form 4 is comprised of 
two tables: the first is for reporting conventional stock or non-derivative transaction information and 
the second is for reporting transactions such as options, warrants, and convertible securities. Form 5 
documents exempt transactions, which include, among other things, small transactions or small 
transfers within company plans that are not required to be reported on Form 4. Finally, Form 144 is 
reserved for declarations of intention to sell restricted18 and control19 securities.  Report of the sale 
of restricted or controlled shares by insiders, however, is required only when the sale involves more 
than 5,000 shares or aggregate dollar value of $50,000 in any three-month period. Also, the 
proposed sale should take place within three months after filing Form144 or another notice must be 
filed.  
This study uses the data from Form 4. Data from other forms are excluded from the sample. 
Specifically, Form 3 only reports the initial ownership of an insider and does not include any 
                                                          
18
 Restricted securities are those shares that are acquired through an unregistered private sale from an issuer or its 
affiliates. 
19
 Control securities are securities that are held by firm affiliates who have the power to direct the management and 
influence company policies. See Securities and Exchange Commission at www.sec.gov/investor/pubs/rule144.htm. 
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information about the use of nonpublic information by firm insiders. Likewise, Form 5 only 
includes trades that are exempt from reporting on Form 4. Form 144 does not report any actual 
transactions by firms’ CEOs, rather it declares an intention to conduct transactions by an insider. 
The announced transaction may not take place. If any share is traded following the filing of 
Form144, however, the trade must be reported through Form 4. Therefore, Form 4 provides 
sufficient data for this study.  
  
3.2. Sample Data 
Data for CEO insider trades are from Thomson Reuters Insider Trading database. In addition 
to direct trades by CEOs, trades conducted by the CEOs’ relatives as well as transactions 
originating from indirect ownership by CEOs are also included in the sample. The time period for 
the study is 1996 to 2008. This period is selected due to the availability of data and because it 
allows the investigation of the impact of SOX.  
The sample excludes the records that are not reliable. Since records reported to the SEC by 
firm insiders may contain errors, Thomson Reuters validates all reported data by cross-checking 
them with other data sources and eventually assigns each record a cleansing indicator (see 
Appendix A). The cleansing record indicates the level of reliability of each record. Using the 
cleansing record, transactions with low levels of reliability (that is cleansing records S and A in 
Appendix A), are excluded from the sample.   
  As presented in Appendix B, there are initially 1,138,387 individual reported trades by firm 
CEOs in the Thomson Reuters Insiders database for the time period. In the first step, 27,759 
records, whose validity could not be verified by Thomson Reuters, are excluded. Appendix C shows 
an annual breakdown of records with various cleansing codes to show how the accuracy of data 
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increased throughout the sample time period. In the second step, 73,425 records that are reported on 
forms other than Form 4, are excluded. Furthermore, 455,876 records of non-open-market trades are 
excluded since the focus of this study is on open-market trades. The final sample contains 581,327 
records. 
Unlike several previous studies that focused on purchase trades (for example Garfinkel et 
al., 2007), both purchase and sell trades are retained in the sample. Studies that ignore sell trades 
argue that sell trades are less likely to be based on nonpublic information since they take place for 
such reasons as liquidity and wealth diversification (Kim and Verrecchia, 1994, Baiman and 
Verrecchia, 1996) and are exposed to higher litigation risk levels (Cheng and, Lo, 2006). Although 
sell trades are more likely than buy trades to happen for other reasons, such as need for liquidity or 
wealth diversification (Lakonishok and Lee, 2001, Huddart and Ke, 2007), sell trades can still be 
based on nonpublic information. The fact that insider sell trades often take place for purposes such 
as providing liquidity or wealth diversification makes sell trades desired vehicles to hide the abuse 
of nonpublic information. Moreover, even sell trades, which occur for liquidity or diversification 
purposes, may benefit from some nonpublic information to earn higher returns for trading insider.   
As presented in Table 1 (tables and figures are presented in Appendix H), among the final 
sample of 581,327 open-market transactions conducted by firm CEOs and reported on Form4 form 
the beginning of 1996 to the end of 2008, 482,433 records are sell transactions (82.99 percent of all 
open-market trades) and 98,894 records are buy transactions (17.01 percent of all open-market 
trades). The transactions are filed from 11,183 distinct firms during the sample period. Buy 
transactions are from 8,219 distinct firms and sell transactions are from 7,063 distinct firms.  
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Figure 1 shows the trend of annual trade frequency from 1996 to 2008 for buy (acquisition) 
and sell (disposition) trades20. The figure indicates that although the number of trades has been 
rising during all years except 2008, most of the growth can be attributed to sell transactions. The 
larger number of sell trades compared with that of buys reflects the increasing portion of equity and 
derivative awards in CEOs' compensation packages.  
 Table 2 presents the distribution of the number of transacted shares and transaction value of 
the trades (value is defined as the number of traded shares multiplied by their price). As can be 
observed in this table, the buy transactions volumes are generally larger than those of sell 
transactions. The figures also indicate that the number of shares in a typical sell trade is fewer than 
that of a buy trade. Also, the figures indicate that sell transactions are conducted more frequently, 
yet in smaller volumes, than buy transactions.  
The breakdown of trades by year and industry is provided to check whether the insider 
trades are time or industry specific. Table 3 does not indicate that any year or industry dominates 
the data. Furthermore, in order to obtain more assurance that the results are not driven by 
observations from any specific year or industry, clustering in year and industry dimensions is 
performed in the models as a robustness test. As an extra robustness measure, the records with 
unclassified industry are excluded from the sample data where clustering is performed on industry 
variables. 
Data on board characteristics are from the RiskMetrics Directors database. The RiskMetrics 
Directors dataset covers a range of board characteristics and has been updated annually from 
                                                          
20
 Acquisition (A) code represents buy trades and Disposition (D) code represents sell trades.  
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199621. Table 4 presents the summary statistics for the internal governance mechanisms, which are 
used in this study. The figures indicate that independent directors have a significant presence on the 
board of the firms in the sample. Also, the figures show that the directors in the sample typically 
have external directorships as well. Moreover, the figures on independent directors ownership 
indicates that stock ownership by independent directors is typically low.   
It is necessary to have a clear vision of directors' affiliation with a firm as the emphasis of 
this study is on the role of independent directors. Based on their affiliation with their associated 
firm, directors are categorized into three groups in the RiskMetrics database: independent, linked, 
and employee. Independent members are defined as those who have no significant connection with 
the firm. Linked or affiliated directors are those who provide professional services to the company 
or its major customers and include former employees, recipients of charitable funds, interlocks, and 
family members of a director or executive22. Finally, employee directors are those who are currently 
employed by the company. Appendix E provides the detailed definition for each class of directors.. 
Appendix F provides the breakdown of the number of directors in each category in each year. The 
figure shows that the proportion of independent directors has significantly increased during recent 
years.  
As suggested by asset pricing models, some of firm characteristics such as size and book-to-
market ratio affect stock returns as well (e.g. Chan, Hamao, and Lakonishok, 1991 and Fama and 
French, 1992). The same characteristics are also suggested to be influential on trading behavior of 
firms' insiders. For instance, it is suggested that larger and faster growing firms (lower Book/Market 
                                                          
21
 The current universe of data is S&P 1500 companies. In earlier years, however, data were also collected for a few 
hundred additional large-cap companies. Reported fields included name, age, tenure, gender, committee membership, 
independence classification, primary employer and title, number of other public company boards serving on, shares 
owned, former employer, charity affiliation, designated director status, business transaction status, relative of an 
executive office status, and interlocking directorship. 
22
 From RiskMetrics Directors database in Wharton Research Data Services. 
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ratios) tend to have more equity-based compensation (Demsetz and Lehn, 1985; Rozeff and Zaman, 
1988) and consequently, the insiders in those types of firms trade more frequently. Another factor 
that can impact both abnormal return and the intensity of trading by insiders is the liquidity of a 
firm’s stocks. More liquid stocks are usually associated with lower levels of information asymmetry 
between a firm’s insiders and outsiders. Liquidity of stocks has frequently been used as a measure 
for existing information asymmetry between owners and managers, or outsiders and insiders in case 
of this study.  The data for firm financial characteristics are from Compustat and their summary 
statistics are presented in Table 523.  
4. Methodology and Results 
4.1. Abnormal Return of Insider Trades 
Since abnormal return following each trade is suggested to be a proxy for the magnitude of 
the incorporated nonpublic information in the trade (Rogoff, 1964, Jaffe, 1974 and Jagolinzer, 
2009), the abnormal returns are calculated for each of the CEOs' insider trades in the sample to 
estimate the level of incorporated nonpublic information in each trade. 
The abnormal return calculation is done separately for buy and sell portfolios due to 
opposite signs24 of abnormal return in each group and different characteristics of buy and sell trades 
(Kim and Verrecchia, 1994; Baiman and Verecchia, 1996; Cheng and, Lo, 2006) and the sign of 
abnormal return in each category. Previous studies suggest that sell trades are less likely to be based 
on nonpublic information and that such trades are usually conducted for other motivations such as 
                                                          
23
 The definitions of all the variables used throughout this study are in Appendix D.   
 
24
 The abnormal return for sell trades is the negative abnormal return following an insider trade and represents the 
abnormal avoided loss by the insider trader. 
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need for liquidity and wealth diversification. It was shown that the abnormal returns are generally 
higher for buy insider trades than they are for sell insider trades (Garfinkel et al, 2007). Similarly, it 
has been documented that, that purchase trades are more informative than sell trades (Seyhun, 1988) 
and that the predicting power of purchase trades is higher than that of sell trades in forecasting 
market movements (Lakonishok and Lee, 2001). 
To calculate the abnormal returns, an event study technique is used. The abnormal return is 
calculated by means of a Fama-French Four-Factor model25 (Bharath et al., 2009). The event period 
is 90 days following a trade (Jagolinzer, 2009) and the estimation period is a window from 250 to 
10 days before each trade. The 250-day estimation method is commonly used in similar event 
studies the literature26. The data for 10 days immediately preceding the transaction date are 
excluded to avoid the potential influence of information leak prior to each trade. The Fama-French 
Four-Factor model is as follows: 
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Where &'( is the return of a trade on a day t, &)( is the risk-free rate of return on a day t, and 
&*( is the return of the whole stock market on a day t. In the model, SMB27 (Small Minus Big) 
measures the historic excess returns of smaller companies over larger companies, HML (High 
Minus Low), measures the historic excess returns of value stocks over growth stocks and UMD 
                                                          
25
 The model is also known as Carhart’s four-factor model. 
26
 Other event period lengths are used for robustness test analyses. 
27
 The factors data are from French’s website (http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/index.html). 
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(momentum factor) specifies the abnormal return, which can be explained by prior returns28. The 
daily abnormal returns are cumulated to obtain the 90-day Cumulative Abnormal Return (CAR). 
A 90-day window (as in Jagolinzer, 2009) is regarded as a reasonable time window for the 
diffuse of nonpublic information into the market. It does not seem very likely that CEOs can delay 
or accelerate firm decisions for more than three months around a trade without the information 
leaking out. The selection of longer windows could increase the noise from other sources, such as 
other corporate events. In addition, only distinct trades per day are considered in the calculation of 
abnormal returns due to the possibility that trades executed in one day may had beeen reported 
individually or aggregately.    
The Fama-French Four-Factor model is preferred to other methods, such as CAPM, net of 
market and market models, due to its higher ability in explaining returns. In contrast to other 
models, the Fama-French Four-Factor model controls for differences in size and book-to-market 
ratio among firms. As previous studies have suggested, a significant portion of abnormal returns 
calculated by other methods are driven by insiders’ propensity to buy small and value stocks (Jeng 
et al., 2003). 
Table 6 presents the summary statistics for cumulative abnormal returns on CEOs’ buy and 
sell trades in the sample. The number and proportion of trades with favorable returns for trading 
insiders is also reported for each group of trades. Positive return is considered as the favorable 
return for the buy trades and negative return is considered as the favorable return for the sell trades. 
The results show that the CEOs' average abnormal return is 14.66 percent for buy trades 6.05 
percent for sell trades in a 90-day post-trade window. The abnormal returns are statistically and 
                                                          
28
 UMD is calculated by six monthly portfolios which are formed by intersecting portfolios on size (two portfolios on 
market equity) and prior returns (three portfolios on prior returns). The monthly size breakpoints used are the median 
NYSE market equity figures and monthly prior return breakpoints are the monthly 30th and 70th NYSE percentiles. 
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economically significant. The results are consistent with the results of previous studies, which 
suggested that open-market buy trades are on average more profitable than open-market sell trades. 
The results also show that 61.57 percent of CEOs’ buy trades are followed by positive abnormal 
returns and 59.18 percent of CEOs' sell trades are followed by negative abnormal returns during the 
event window. The results from other abnormal return calculation methods, such as market model 
and net-of-market model confirm that CEOs earn positive abnormal returns on their buy trades and 
avoid negative abnormal losses on their sell trades.  
The results on sell trades are particularly interesting since many previous studies ignore sell 
trades under the impression that such trades are less likely to be information-driven. The results 
indicate, however, that nonpublic information is used by CEOs in sell trades, as well as in buy 
trades, despite the suggested higher likelihood of litigation for sell trades and other potential reasons 
for sell trades including need for liquidity and wealth diversification. In a recent study, Cohen et al. 
(2011) document significant abnormal returns for insider sell trades.  
Table 7 shows the potential impact of firm size and the B/M ratio on the measured abnormal 
returns in a univariate setting, as it is suggested that the abnormal returns resulting from insider 
trades are associated with some firm characteristics (Seyhun, 1986, 1988; Lin and Howe, 1990). 
Firm Size is measured as the natural logarithm of a firm’s total assets. B/M ratio is measured as the 
book value of equity to the market value of equity in a firm. The results, as presented in Table 7, 
suggest that CEOs in smaller firms earn higher abnormal returns on their trades than do their peers 
in larger firms. The results for the B/M ratio, however, is mixed: Buy trades yield higher abnormal 
returns in value firms (higher B/M ratios), while sell trades earn higher abnormal returns (avoid 
higher abnormal losses) in growth firms (lower B/M ratios).  
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4.1.1. Internal Corporate Governance and Abnormal Return of Insider Trades 
 This section investigates the impact internal governance mechanisms have on mitigating the 
use of nonpublic information in CEOs’ trades. Following the literature, the abnormal return is 
considered as a proxy of the incorporated nonpublic information. Consequently, the impact of 
internal governance on the abnormal returns of CEOs' trades is considered as a proxy for the impact 
of internal governance mechanisms on the spread of the incorporation of nonpublic information in 
CEOs' trades. Internal governance mechanisms affect the potential abnormal return of insider 
trading, mainly by affecting the information asymmetry between a firm’s insiders and outsiders, 
which is the source of abnormal profitability of informed trades. The stronger governance 
mechanisms also increase the probability that those who perform informed insider trades will be 
detected and punished.  The following model is used to estimate the impact of internal governance 
mechanisms on the abnormal return of the CEOs’ insider trades. 
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The dependent variable is the 90-days cumulative abnormal return (CAR) for each trade in a 
firm i at a date t. The independent variables are Board Independence, measured as the proportion of 
independent directors to the board size, Duality, a binary variable that is equal to one when the CEO 
is also COB. In addition, Multiple Directorship, which is the average number of outside board seats 
held by the independent directors, and Directors Ownership, which is the total percentage of shares 
owned by independent directors, are included to control for differences among independent 
directors.   
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The control variables are Firm Size, B/M ratio and Liquidity29. Firm Size is measured as the 
natural logarithm of a firm’s total assets. B/M ratio is measured as the book value of equity to the 
market value of equity in a firm. Liquidity is measured as the proportion of the total annual number 
of shares traded to the number of outstanding shares in a firm at the end of its fiscal year (Ravina 
and Sapienza, 2010). The correlation tables for the variables (explanatory and control) are in 
Appendix G. 
A binary variable for SOX measures the impact of the implementation of SOX on the 
abnormal return of the CEOs’ insider trades. The SOX binary variable is equal to zero for trades 
that took place before the SOX and is equal to one for other trades after SOX30. In addition, binary 
variables for each year and each sector (12 sectors as reported on Thomson Reuters database) are 
included in the model to control for year and sector fixed effects31.  
The results of the Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regressions of the equation (5) on the entire 
sample are shown in Table 8. When the entire sample is considered, no judgment is made about the 
significance of the underlying nonpublic information. Indeed, the insider trades may not be based 
on any insider information or they may have benefited from various levels of nonpublic 
information. In the next sections, the trades are distinguished based on their underlying nonpublic 
information and the impact of internal governance mechanisms is investigated for the trades which 
are estimated to be based on more significant nonpublic information.  
                                                          
29
 Volatility of stock prices was initially considered as one of control variables, but it was dropped from the model due 
to its significant correlation with Liquidity. Liquidity proved to be more explanatory than Volatility for abnormal 
returns.  
30
 August 1, 2002 is considered the cutoff date for SOX. 
31
 As a robustness test, the model is also regressed by clustering at the sector level. In addition, the results are checked 
with a firm-level fixed effects model. 
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Table 8 shows that there is not a statistically significant association between board 
independence and abnormal returns of the buy trades. However, the corresponding result for sell 
trade is statistically significant and indicates that higher board independence is associated with 
lower abnormal returns. The result for sell trades is consistent with the first hypothesis of this 
study.32 The results indicate that higher board independence has a more significant impact on 
abnormal returns of the sell trades than those of buy trades. The results imply higher levels of 
information asymmetry between insiders and outsiders in insider sell trades. The elevated 
information asymmetry partially stems from the fact that insider sell trades takes place for a range 
of reasons from wealth diversification and need for liquidity to profit on nonpublic information. 
Also, sell trades are conducted more frequently and in smaller volumes than buy trades. That makes 
the external monitoring more costly and potentially less effective. The results indicate that 
independent directors are more instrumental in preventing the abuse of nonpublic information 
where information asymmetry is higher. The role of SOX on information asymmetry and 
consequently, on the potential role of internal governance mechanisms will be discussed in coming 
sections.  
The results on duality show that the association between CEO/COB duality status and the 
abnormal return of buy trades is not statistically significant for buy trades. The results for sell 
trades, however, are statistically significant and indicate that CEOs earn significantly higher 
abnormal returns when they preside over the board. Similar to the results for board independence, 
the results on duality suggest that the impact of separation of the CEO and COB positions on 
lowering the abnormal returns of CEOs' insider trades is more significant on sell trades than on buy 
trades. The results stress the effectiveness of board of directors' monitoring on sell trades.  
                                                          
32
 The regressions results are checked by using firm fixed effects for robustness analysis purposes. 
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In Table 8, the findings on multiple directorships suggest an association between 
independent directors who hold a large number of directorships and a lower abnormal return earned 
on CEOs’ buy trades. This observation is consistent with “reputation hypothesis,” which argues that 
multiple directorships held by a director are a signal of his/her quality in performing his/her duties. 
The results imply that independent directors with higher number of outside directorships are more 
effective in reducing information asymmetry between firms' insiders and outsiders, despite the time 
and energy burden of handling extra directorships. The results can also imply that independent 
directors with multiple directorships can afford to be tougher in their monitoring duties, due to the 
extra power and influence stemming from their reputation and network. Nonetheless, the 
corresponding results for sell trades are consistent with "busy director hypothesis". The impact of 
independent directors' multiple directorships on sell trades indicate that independent directors with 
more directorships are less effective in reducing CEOs' trades abnormal returns than their peers with 
lower number of directorships. The results underline the higher asymmetry information about sell 
trades that demands more time and energy of independent directors.  
Table 8 also shows that the level of stock ownership by independent directors has a positive 
correlation with the abnormal returns of the CEOs’ trades in both buy and sell categories. The 
results imply that when independent directors have higher equity ownership in a firm, their 
effectiveness in reducing information asymmetry or in monitoring CEOs' insider trades subside. All 
other things being the same, independent directors who have lower equity ownership are more 
effective in reducing the abnormal returns earned on CEOs’ trades. The results can be explained by 
the fact that independent directors are also able to benefit from nonpublic information by trading the 
securities of the firm. Ravina and Sapienza (2010) document that independent directors earn 
abnormal returns that are close to the returns earned by the firm's management. The higher levels of 
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equity ownership by independent directors make their interests more aligned with those of the 
CEOs, rather than with those of the shareholders.33 Nonetheless, more analysis is required for a 
conclusion about this variable. More analyses will be performed in coming sections. 
Table 8 also shows that SOX has significantly reduced the abnormal returns of buy and sell 
trades. The results underline the impact SOX had in reducing the information asymmetry between 
firms’ insiders and outsiders, as well as in increasing the expected costs of conducting informed 
insider trading through tougher penalties for those who violate insider trading law.  
 The results in this section particularly showed that the board monitoring is more effective 
on CEOs' sell trades than on CEOs' buy trades, when all trades are investigated, regardless of their 
level of underlying nonpublic information. As mentioned, the results indicate that the degree of 
information asymmetry is higher for sell trades and it makes monitoring by the markets and the 
SEC less effective.  
4.1.2. Impact of SOX on the Effectiveness of Internal Corporate Governance 
Mechanisms  
Considering the significant impact of SOX and the regulatory environment on the level of 
information asymmetry and expected costs of the violation of insider trading regulations, it is 
expected that the role of the internal governance mechanisms is partially substituted by SOX. 
Studying the impact of SOX on the potential role of internal governance mechanisms also sheds 
light on the interaction between internal and external (such as law/regulation) governance 
                                                          
33
 Including the quadratic form of independent directors’ ownership in the model does not change the results.  
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mechanisms. This section distinguishes between before and after SOX eras and compares the 
effectiveness of internal governance mechanisms on insider trades within these two periods.  
Two approaches are taken to estimate the impact of SOX on the effectiveness of internal 
governance mechanisms. In the first approach, interactive variables between SOX binary variable 
and individual internal governance variables are used. The interactive variables capture the change 
in the impact of internal governance mechanisms caused by SOX. In the second approach, separate 
regressions are run for before and after SOX took effect.  
The following model is used in the first approach. 
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Table 9 reports the results of the regression of the equation (6). 
 The results of Table 9 also show that the association between board independence and 
abnormal return for buy trades was not statistically significant before SOX. The result for the board 
independence indicative variable does not indicate any significant change in the impact of board 
independence on abnormal returns after SOX took effect. The results for the sell trades, however, 
indicate that board independence was negatively associated with the abnormal returns of CEOs' 
trades before SOX (positively related with avoided losses). The results also indicate that the 
negative association weakened after SOX, as hypothesized.  
  On the issue of duality, Table 9 shows that the combination of CEO and COB positions is 
associated with higher abnormal returns for both buy and sell trades after SOX, but not before it 
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took effect. The result speaks to the importance of the separation of the CEO and COB positions in 
limiting the abuse of nonpublic information by CEOs and provides an example for the complement 
effect of an internal governance mechanism with an external one. The result is significant, both 
statistically and economically. 
The results on multiple directorships shown in Table 9 suggest that before SOX, multiple 
directorships were associated with higher abnormal returns for buy and sell trades. The observation 
is consistent with the "busy director hypothesis," which predicts that monitoring by independent 
directors weakens as the number of directorships increases. The results for the indicative variable 
between the multiple directorship variable and the SOX binary variable indicate that the 
implementation of SOX did not significantly change the effect of multiple directorship on buy 
trades, while it weakened the effect for sell trades, as hypothesized. The post-SOX result for sell 
trades indicates that the impact of multiple directorships became consistent with "reputation 
hypothesis." This result indicates that SOX reduced the impact of time and effort spent by 
independent directors to prevent the abuse of nonpublic information, while it increased the 
importance of the presence of independent directors of higher quality, who are awarded higher 
numbers of director seats.  
The results for independent directors’ ownership in Table 9 show that higher ownership 
levels by independent directors are associated with higher abnormal returns on CEOs’ trades in the 
pre-SOX era. Furthermore, the impact of directors' ownership weakened after SOX for both buy and 
sell categories, as hypothesized in this study. The results on directors' ownership indicate that SOX 
reduced the misalignment between independent directors' interests and those of the shareholders, 
which stemmed from the potential ability of independent directors to profit on their nonpublic 
information, particularly when they have larger ownership in the firm.   
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Similar to the results in Table 8, the results in Table 9 on the direct impact of SOX on the 
abnormal return of CEOs' trades suggest that the abnormal return of buy and sell trades reduced 
significantly after SOX.  
In the second approach, equation (6) is regressed separately for the pre- and post-SOX eras. 
Accordingly, the binary variable SOX and indicative variable are dropped from the regression in 
this regression. The results are reported in Table 10.  
The results in Table 10 indicate that board independence had no significant effect on the 
abnormal returns of buy trades either before or after SOX. The results for sell trades, however, 
indicate that abnormal returns on CEOs sell trades are lower when a higher proportion of board is 
comprised of independent directors. In addition, it is observed that the association between board 
independence and abnormal returns of CEOs' sell trades weakened after SOX, as hypothesized34.  
On the issue of duality, the results in Table 10 show indicate that the impact of CEO/COB 
duality status on buy trades is not statistically significant before SOX. After the SOX, however, a 
positive association between the combination of CEO and COB positions and abnormal returns are 
observed for buy and sell trades. CEOs earn higher abnormal returns or avoid higher abnormal 
losses when they also chair the board. This observation highlights the complement impact of duality 
status on SOX in preventing the abuse of non-public information by firms' insiders. The results 
imply that SOX is more effective when CEO is less entrenched through the lack of board 
chairmanship. Similarly, the association between duality and abnormal returns was not significant 
for sell trades before SOX, but became significant afterwards. Again, the results speak to the more 
pronounced impact of the separation of the CEO and the COB positions after SOX.  
                                                          
34
 Nonetheless, the performed t-test does indicate that the observed reduction in the impact of board independence in 
sell trades is not statistically significant. 
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The results in Table 10 on multiple directorships indicate that independent directors' 
multiple directorships were associated with higher abnormal returns earned by CEOs on buy and 
sell trades before SOX (that is higher avoided loss in case of sell trades). This observation is 
consistent with the “busy director hypothesis” and suggests that independent directors with lower 
numbers of outside directorships were associated with lower abnormal returns earned by affiliated 
CEOs.  Nonetheless, the results for the post-SOX period indicate that the impact of multiple 
directorships is not significance in either trade categories35. The results imply that after SOX the 
association between spendable time and energy by independent directors and the directors' 
effectiveness in preventing the abuse of nonpublic information by firms' CEOs weakened, while the 
importance of a director's reputation, which is considered a signal of quality, increased.  
The results in Table 10 on independent directors' stock ownership suggest that the higher 
stock ownership by independent directors is associated with higher abnormal returns on the buy and 
sell trades before SOX. The association, however, weakened after SOX. As explained before, this 
result is consistent with the observation by Ravina and Sapienza (2010) that independent directors 
are also able to profit on their nonpublic information. Therefore, larger ownership by independent 
directors may align their interests toward those of CEOs and reduce independent directors' 
efficiency in their monitoring role. The results in Table 10 imply that after SOX, stock ownership 
by independent directors is not associated with higher abnormal returns for CEOs anymore. Even, 
the results for sell trades indicate that higher stock ownership by independent directors is associated 
with lower abnormal returns by the CEOs (that is lower abnormal losses). The results suggest that 
SOX aligned the interests of independent directors with those of shareholders.  
                                                          
35
 The results of the t-test for buy trades suggest that the impact of multiple directorship for buy trades is not 
significantly different before and after SOX, while the result of the t-test for sell trades indicates that that the impact of 
multiple directorship is significantly different  before and after SOX. 
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In summary, the results of this section, which investigates CEOs' insider regardless the 
significance of their underlying nonpublic information, indicate that SOX significantly lowered the 
abnormal returns of buy and sell trades. Also, the results indicate that board independence impact 
on sell trades is more significant than its impact on buy trades. Additionally, the results indicate that 
the impact of duality status became more significant (both statistically and economically) after SOX 
for buy and sell trades.    
Thus far, all the analyses in this study are performed on the entire sample of buy and sell 
trades. As mentioned in previous sections, not all insider trades are purely based on non-public 
information. More precisely, not all insider trades are based on equally significant (material) non-
public information. While some insider trades do not take advantage of any insider trades, other 
trades may be based on various levels of nonpublic information. To test the effectiveness of the 
internal governance mechanisms in reducing the abuse of nonpublic information, the following 
section estimates the trades that are based on more significant non-public information and 
subsequently investigates the role of internal governance mechanisms in preventing such trades.   
4.1.3. The Role of Governance Mechanisms and Significance of the Incorporated 
Nonpublic Information  
The access to nonpublic information gives an advantage to firms' insiders over other market 
participants and such an advantage should yield abnormal returns in form of overperformance for 
buy trades and underperformance for sell trades (Jeng et al., 2003). Hence, the abnormal return of 
an insider trade is used as a measure for the significance of the nonpublic information underlying a 
trade. The application of abnormal returns in estimating underlying nonpublic information is 
supported by major asymmetric information models (the price-taking model of Grossman and 
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Stiglitz, 1976 and the imperfect competition model of Kyle, 1985), too. From a technical point of 
view, Piotroski and Roulstone (2007) suggest that an insider’s transaction has a greater probability 
of being scrutinized and “red flagged” as having been motivated by private information if the trade 
is followed by a material stock price change or a large earnings surprise. 
This section focuses on trades that are more likely to be driven by nonpublic information 
and tests the hypotheses by using those data. The observed abnormal returns following the trades 
are used to estimate the significance of nonpublic information. Then, insider trades are ranked based 
on the magnitude of their earned abnormal return. As such, trades, which are followed by higher 
abnormal returns, are interpreted to be based on more significant nonpublic information than those 
trades that are followed by less significant abnormal returns.36 By applying a cutoff value for 
abnormal returns, a subset of trades, which are more likely to be based on more significant non-
public information is selected and the impact of internal corporate governance mechanisms is 
analyzed within this subsample. In this study, a 0 percent cutoff value is considered to form the 
subsample of trades, which are more significantly information-driven than others. The buy trades 
with positive abnormal returns and the sell trades with negative abnormal returns are selected as 
trades with higher likelihood of being information-driven. 
Equation (6) is regressed on the subsample of more significantly informed trades through 
two approaches: interaction variables and separate regressions. Table 11 reports the results for the 
approach that considers SOX as a structural change and applies interactive variables, while Table 12 
reports the results on separate regressions for pre- and post-SOX eras. 
                                                          
36
 The trades are not claimed to be free of nonpublic information since the materiality of information is only estimated. 
By ranking the trades based on their abnormal returns, they are claimed to be based on more or less nonpublic 
information, rather a definite judgment. In addition, it can be argued that insider trades are generally based on some 
nonpublic information, more or less, due to information superiority of the insiders. 
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In Table 11, the results on board independence confirm prior results on sell trades, which 
indicated that board independence is associated with lower abnormal returns for sell trades. The 
results also show that the impact is stronger for more significantly informed trades. Furthermore, 
the results show a negative association between board independence and abnormal returns of buy 
trades. Recall that the corresponding results were not statistically significant when the full sample 
was used. Indeed, comparing the results of Table 11 with those of Table 9, which is reported on the 
full sample, reveals that the impact of board independence is stronger on trades (buy and sell) that 
are based on more significant nonpublic information. In addition, the results show that the impact of 
board independence weakened after SOX for both trade categories, consistent with the second 
hypothesis of this study. Indeed, the observed effects of board independence confirm the predictions 
of the hypotheses, when the investigation focused on trades with more significant incorporated 
nonpublic information. 
The results on duality in Table 11 also confirm previous results that duality status did not 
have a significant impact on the abnormal return of CEOs’ trades before SOX. Furthermore, 
consistent with previous results, the results suggest that the combination of the CEO and the COB 
positions is associated with higher abnormal returns in buy and sell categories post-SOX. 
The results on the impact of multiple directorships in Table 11 indicate that, unlike the 
previous results obtained on the full sample, the association of multiple directorship and abnormal 
returns is not significant before SOX. It can be inferred that the observed positive association in the 
full sample, which is consistent with the “busy director hypothesis,” is mainly driven by trades that 
are based on less significant nonpublic information. The result can imply that preventing insider 
trades with less significant nonpublic information depends on the time and effort independent 
directors can allocate to their duties and preventing CEOs from abusing more significant nonpublic 
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information is not dependent on time and effort spent by independent directors. Nonetheless, the 
result for the interactive variable between SOX and multiple directorship variables is similar to the 
results on the full sample. It suggests that independent directors with higher numbers of outside 
directorships are more effective in reducing the abnormal returns on buy and sell trades after SOX. 
The observation is consistent with the “reputation hypothesis” and underlines the importance of the 
quality of independent directors in achieving their monitoring duties after SOX.  
The results on the impact of independent directors’ ownership on the abnormal return of 
more significantly informed trades also confirm previous results. They suggest that higher levels of 
ownership by independent directors are associated with higher abnormal returns by CEOs before 
SOX. As ownership of independent directors increases, their effectiveness in reducing information 
asymmetry and monitoring CEOs decreases. As before, the results suggest that higher levels of 
equity ownership by independent directors make their interests more aligned with those of the 
CEOs before SOX. The results in Table 11 on the subsample of trades that are based on more 
significantly informed trades indicate that the association between ownership and CEOs' abnormal 
returns did not change significantly for buy trades following SOX, while it significantly decreased 
for sell trades.  
The results in Table 11 also confirm previous results that SOX is associated with 
significantly lower abnormal returns of buy and sell trades. As before, the impact of SOX is more 
economically significant in buy trades, possibly due to the higher proportion of buy trades that are 
based on nonpublic information (Kim and Verrecchia, 1994, Baiman and Verecchia, 1996, Cheng 
and, Lo, 2006).  
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In a second approach, the regression to investigate the impact of internal governance 
mechanisms on the abnormal return of more significantly informed trades is done separately for 
pre- and post-SOX periods and the results are presented in Table 12. The results in Table 12 also 
confirm that board independence is negatively associated with abnormal returns in the information-
driven subsample for buy and sell trades before SOX. The results for the post-SOX era also confirm 
that the association between board independence and abnormal returns weakened after SOX, as 
hypothesized. The post-SOX results for buy trades, however, are significantly positive. 
Nonetheless, as firm fixed effects are controlled for in the model as a robustness test, the association 
is negative and weaker than that of the pre-SOX period,37 supporting the hypotheses of this study.   
The results on duality in Table 12 also indicate that there is no significant association 
between duality and abnormal returns of buy trades before SOX. This result is similar to the one 
obtained on the full sample of CEOs' insider trades. Also confirming prior results, the results for 
buy trades after SOX show that the combination of CEO and COB positions is associated with 
significantly higher abnormal returns on CEOs' trades. For sell trades, the results indicate the 
combination of CEO and COB positions is associated with higher abnormal returns (that is avoided 
losses) both before and after SOX.  
Confirming prior results, the results on multiple directorship in Table 12 show no 
association between multiple directorship of independent directors and abnormal returns of 
materially informed trades before SOX. After SOX, however, independent directors' multiple 
directorship is associated with lower abnormal returns of CEOs’ trades in buy and sell categories, 
supporting the "reputation hypothesis". This result indicates that independent directors with more 
outside directorships are more effective in reducing the abnormal returns of CEOs' trades that are 
                                                          
37
 The results for firm fixed effects are not tabulated. 
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perceived to be based on more significantly informed trades. The results speak to the importance of 
independent directors quality in preventing the abuse of nonpublic information by CEOs. 
The results in Table 12 on independent directors’ ownership confirm results found through 
previous approach. The results indicate that independent directors with higher ownership are 
associated with higher CEOs’ abnormal returns before SOX for both buy and sell trades. 
Furthermore, the impact is not significant after SOX. It implies that the interests of independent 
directors became more aligned with those of shareholders after SOX. 
Thus far, as part of the investigation of the impact of internal governance mechanisms on 
CEOs' insider trading, the abnormal return of such trades is examined. Another important aim of 
this study is to investigate whether stronger board monitoring would reduce the incidents of the 
abuse of nonpublic information by firms' CEOs. The following section, investigates the relation 
between board monitoring strength and incidence (also called rate) of insider trading by CEOs.  
4.2. Incidence of CEOs’ Insider Trading  
4.2.1. Internal Governance Mechanisms and the Intensity of Insider Trades 
This section investigates the relationship between internal governance mechanisms and the 
incidence of CEOs’ insider trading. As in previous sections, first the full sample of trades is 
investigated. Then, a subsample of trades that are based on more significant nonpublic information 
is used in the models. As mentioned in the hypothesis development section, it is expected that 
stronger board monitoring reduces the incidence of informed trading by CEOs.  
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To investigate the impact of internal corporate governance mechanisms on the incidence of 
CEOs' insider trades, a measure is needed for the latter variable. The total number38 of shares traded 
by a CEO within a year divided by the number of shares outstanding in the firm in that year is used 
(Bettis et al., 2000)39.  The measure is called intensity hereafter.  
The following model is used to investigate the impact of board monitoring on the CEOs’ 
trade intensity. The estimation is performed through two approaches. The first approach includes a 
binary variable for SOX and interactive variables between the SOX binary variable and each of the 
internal governance variables. The second approach performs separate regressions for pre- and post-
SOX periods. 
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The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of the proportion of annualized number of 
traded shares by a CEO to the number of outstanding shares in a firm. The explanatory variables are 
similar to those in previous models40. The results of the OLS regressions of equation (7) on the full 
sample are presented in Table 13. 
The results in Table 13 show that higher levels of board independence are associated with 
lower intensities of insider trading by CEOs in both buy and sell trades. Importantly, the negative 
                                                          
38
 The volume of annualized insider trades by CEOs can also be used, but using volume may cause the volatile prices to 
affect the results. 
39
 Some studies such as Jeng et al. (2003) use other measures for intensity of insider trading such as dividing firms into 
buy and sell trades based of comparison on the number of bought and sold shares by firm insiders. The buy and sell 
portfolios are adjusted periodically in such trades for time series analyses. 
40
 Lakonishok and Lee (2001) suggest that insiders in large firms sell more shares and Rozeff and Zaman (1998) suggest 
that insiders sell more shares in growth firms. 
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associations are statistically significant for both categories. The results for the interactive variable 
between the SOX binary variable and board independence indicate that SOX's impact on the role of 
board independence was not significant in buy trades, while the influence of board independence on 
the intensity of sell trades decreased after SOX, as hypothesized. The observed negative association 
indicates that CEOs trade less intensively in the presence of more independent boards. The reduced 
trading levels can be attributed to lower information asymmetry, which removes some abnormally 
profitable trading opportunities, and higher expected cost of informed trades for the CEOs due to 
higher probabilities of detection by the board. The observed weakening impact of SOX on the role 
of board independence also indicates that SOX has played a substitute role for board independence 
through reducing information asymmetry and by increasing expected costs of trades by the tougher 
penalties. The more pronounced weakening impact of SOX on the role of board independence for 
sell trades implies higher information asymmetry around sell trades.  
The results in Table 13 on duality show that the separation of CEO and COB positions is 
associated with lower trading intensities. The results indicate that CEOs trade more intensively 
when they are also COB. The results also show that the implementation of SOX did not 
significantly affect the impact of duality status on the intensity of insider trades in either buy or sell 
trades. The results also indicate that SOX did not significantly reduce the impact of duality status on 
trade intensity. It is worth noting that although duality status did not have a significant impact on 
abnormal return of CEOs' trades, it did have a significant impact on the intensity of the insider 
trades. The result implies that the separation of CEO and COB positions does not have much impact 
on information asymmetry, but it significantly boosts the monitoring capabilities of a board. The 
separation of CEO and COB positions shifts the power from a CEO to the directors in a board. Such 
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elevated monitoring and enforcement ability of board would significantly reduce the expected 
benefits of informed trades for CEOs and consequently, cause them to trade less intensively. 
The results in Table 13 on multiple directorships show no significant association between 
the number of directorships held by independent directors and the intensity of CEOs' buy trades. 
Also, the results do not show any statistically significant change in the impact of multiple 
directorships due to SOX. The results for sell trades show a statistically significant association 
between multiple directorships and trade intensities. It has been observed that CEOs trade less 
intensively when independent directors hold a higher number of external directorships. The 
observation, which is consistent with "reputation hypothesis," indicates that the presence of more 
highly qualified directors, as signaled by the number of directorships they hold, is associated with 
lower intensities of sell trades before SOX. The coefficient for the indicative variable on multiple 
directorships shows that the association weakened after SOX, as hypothesized.  
The results in Table 13 on independent directors' ownership are consistent with the results 
on the impact of the variable on abnormal returns. The results show that higher levels of ownership 
by independent directors are associated with higher trade intensity by the CEOs for buy and sell 
trades. As noted before, the result implies that independent directors are less effective in monitoring 
the CEOs when they hold larger numbers of stocks. Nonetheless, the results for the interactive 
variable between SOX and independent director ownership suggest that the positive association 
vanishes after SOX, while no statistically significant change is observed for buy trades. 
As for the direct impact of SOX on the intensity of insider trades, Table 13 shows no 
indication that SOX had a consistent direct impact on CEOs' insider trades either in buy or sell 
trades.  
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In a second approach, the equation (7) is regressed separately for pre- and post-SOX periods 
and the results are shown in Table 14. Accordingly, the binary variable SOX and interactive 
variables between SOX and internal governance mechanisms are dropped from the equation.  
The results of Table 14 on board independence show that board independence is associated 
with lower intensities of insider trading for buy and sell trades before SOX, as hypothesized. 
Moreover, the results show that the association remains after SOX, but its magnitude and 
significance are reduced in both trade categories41. The results of Table 14 on duality indicate that 
the combination of CEO and COB positions is associated with higher intensities of CEOs’ insider 
trading for buy and sell trades. The results also confirm that the impact of duality weakened after 
SOX for buy and sell trades.   
The results in Table 14 on multiple directorships show independent directors’ multiple 
directorships had no statistically significant impact on buy trade intensities either before or after 
SOX. The corresponding results for sell trades suggest, however, that independent directors with a 
higher number of outside directorships are associated with lower intensities of insider trades by 
firms’ CEOs. That observation is consistent with “reputation hypothesis.” The results also indicate 
that the implementation of SOX weakened the impact.  
 The results in Table 14 on independent directors' ownership do not show a statistically 
significant relationship between independent directors' stock ownership and CEOs' insider trading 
intensity for buy and sell trades, either before or after SOX.  
                                                          
41
 Still, the result of the performed t-test indicates that the estimated impact of board independence on sell trades is not 
significantly different before and after SOX.   
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In summary, the results of this section suggest that high board independence and the 
separation of CEO and COB positions significantly reduce the intensity of CEOs' insider trading.  
The analyses of this section are conducted on the full sample, without taking into account 
the significance of the nonpublic information underlying each trade. The next section investigates 
the differences in impact internal governance mechanisms have on trades with different levels of 
incorporated nonpublic information. 
4.2.2. Intensity of Insider Trades and Significance of Trades Underlying Nonpublic 
Information 
This section examines the impact of the internal governance mechanisms on trades that are 
estimated to be more significantly information-driven. As in section 4.1.3., the insider trades are 
ranked based on their abnormal returns. Then, trades with favorable abnormal returns (that is 
positive returns for buy trades and negative returns for sell trades) are considered to be trades that 
are based on more significant nonpublic information. Other trades that are not followed by 
favorable abnormal returns are categorized as trades that are based on less significant nonpublic 
information. 
To compare the impact of internal governance mechanisms on trades based on different 
underlying nonpublic information, and instead of performing separate regressions for more 
informed versus less informed trades, the proportion of the number of more informed trades to the 
total number of trades is used as the measure of intensity of informed trades in the following model. 
The analysis results indicate whether stronger internal governance mechanisms reduced bigger 
proportions of more significantly informed trades than less significantly informed trades or vice 
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versa. The model will be also regressed for pre- and post-SOX eras separately, as a second 
approach. 
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The dependent variable is the proportion of the total number of more significantly traded 
shares by a CEO within a year to the total number of shares traded by the CEO in the same year. 
The explanatory and control variables are similar to those in equation (7). The results for the 
regressions on equation (8) are in Table 15.   
The results in Table 15 on board independence indicate that the limiting impact of board 
independence on the intensity of CEOs' buy trades has not been significantly different on trades 
with different levels of incorporated nonpublic information. Board independence did not have a 
significantly different impact on the intensity of more significantly informed trades when buy trades 
were examined. Furthermore, the results show that SOX also did not cause board dependence to 
have a significantly different impact on trades with different levels of non-public information. The 
result implies that independent directors mainly affect buy trades by lowering information 
asymmetry. The lower information asymmetry has a uniform impact on trades with various levels of 
incorporated nonpublic information. Nonetheless, the results for sell trades indicate that board 
independence is more effective in mitigating the trades that are based on more significant nonpublic 
information. Moreover, as hypothesized, the result for sell trades indicates that the impact of board 
independence in lowering the incidence of more significantly informed trades weakened after SOX. 
The results for buy and sell trades support the idea that stronger board monitoring matters more 
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when information asymmetry is more severe, as in sell trades where trades take place because of 
various reasons. The significant impact of board monitoring on sell trades also shed light on weak 
points of external supervision.  
The results in Table 15 on duality indicate that the impact of CEO/COB duality status on the 
incidence of more significantly informed trades is not statistically different from corresponding 
impact on less significantly informed trades for either buy or sell trades before SOX. Furthermore, 
the results suggest that SOX did not significantly affect that relationship.  
The results in Table 15 indicate that the impact of multiple directorships on the intensity of 
insider trading by firms’ CEOs was not significantly different between the trades with different 
levels of underlying nonpublic information in either buy or sell trades. 
The results in Table 15 on independent directors’ ownership indicate that higher stock 
ownership by independent directors is associated with higher proportions of significantly informed 
buy trades, but not sell trades, before SOX. Furthermore, the results for the interactive variable 
between SOX and independent directors’ stock ownership variable do not indicate any significant 
change on the impact of independent directors’ ownership on buy and sell trades after SOX.   
The results on the direct impact of SOX indicate that SOX significantly reduced the 
proportion of significantly informed trades from all trades by CEOs in buy and sell trades.  
In a second approach, equation (8) is regressed separately for pre- and post-SOX eras and 
the results are shown in Table 16. 
The results of Table 16 indicate that board independence does not have a significantly 
different impact on the intensity of buy trades with more significantly informed trades either before 
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or after SOX. The results in Table 16 on sell trades, however, indicate that the limiting effect of 
board independence on the intensity of CEOs’ sell insider trades is more pronounced for trades that 
are estimated to be based on more significant nonpublic information. The results for sell trades also 
confirm prior results that the impact of board independence in reducing informed trades weakened 
after SOX. 
The results on duality do not show any special impact on the intensity of trades with more 
significant underlying information. Table 16 shows, however, the impact of duality on sell trades 
was weakly significant before SOX. The slight difference between the results of tables 15 and 16 on 
sell trades after SOX can be attributed to the difference in capturing the impact of a structural 
change by using a binary variable versus separate regressions. 
Similar to the results presented in Table15, those in Table 16 do not show any specific 
impact of multiple directorship on more significantly informed buy and sell trades either before or 
after SOX. The results in Table 16 on directors’ ownership do not show any different impact on the 
intensity of trades with more significantly informed trades.    
The results in this section confirm that the impact of internal governance mechanisms on the 
intensity of insider trades is almost uniform on buy trades with different levels of underlying 
nonpublic information, while their impact on sell trades is more pronounced on trades with more 
significant underlying nonpublic information. The results emphasize the role of internal governance 
mechanisms when information asymmetry between an insider and a potential monitor is high such 
as for sell trades where information-driven insider trades can be hidden under other justifications 
such as need for liquidity or wealth diversification.   
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4.3. Robustness Tests 
To investigate the robustness of the results, several tests are carried out. Specifically, the 
results proved robust against other abnormal return calculation methods (market model, market-
adjusted model, and Fama-French Three-Factor model). Furthermore, excluding the data for year 
2002, when SOX was implemented, did not change the results. The exclusion of 2002 data was 
done to address a concern about a possibility that insiders started to adapt their behavior toward 
post-SOX conditions before the implementation date of SOX. The results did not change after 
excluding records with unclassified or missing industry code. In addition, the regression results are 
tested by controlling for firm fixed effects and sector clustering. While most results are consistent 
among various approached, few inconsistent results are reported in their affiliated sections. 
Supported by robustness tests, the results indicate that stronger internal corporate 
governance mechanisms, particularly board independence and the separation of CEO and COB 
positions, are associated with lower abnormal returns and incidence of CEOs’ insider trading. 
Furthermore, the results indicate that this association is usually more pronounced for sell trades. 
Nonetheless, endogeneity is a general concern for the research on corporate governance and 
this study is not an exception. The potential endogeneity could enter a bias into regression results 
and cause confusions about the direction of causality between dependent and independent variables. 
In this study, reverse causality between dependent and independent variables is plausible and it 
could serve as a source of endogeneity. Although, theoretical and empirical results of previous 
studies, which were mentioned in this study, support the direction of causality form stronger 
governance mechanisms to lower intensity of CEOs' informed insider trading, an alternative 
explanation for reverse causality could be perceived.  
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The alternative explanation for the observed association between the strength of internal 
corporate governance measures and CEOs' insider trading attributes could argue that the 
relationship is due to CEOs’ influence on the corporate governance structure in general and the 
board structure in particular, rather than due to the hypothesized impact of board monitoring on 
CEOs’ trading behavior. For instance, if a powerful CEO, who exploits (or intends to exploit) 
nonpublic information for personal benefits, weakens effective board monitoring (as an internal 
governance mechanism), a reverse causality direction can be suggested between board monitoring 
and CEOs’ insider trading behavior. CEOs’ influence on board structure could be in forms of, for 
example, nominating directors who are less likely to be effective monitors or taking over the COB 
position by the CEO.   
Indeed, there are studies that propose CEOs' influence on board structure. Boone et al. 
(2007) suggest that managers affect board size and board independence. Adams et al. (2010) 
suggest that board structure is a function of a CEOs’ power. Baker and Gompers (2003), Boone et 
al. (2007) and Ryan and Wiggins (2004) suggest that CEOs are able to push for boards with lower 
proportions of independent directors. Shivdasani and Yermack (1990) suggest that when CEOs are 
involved in the selection of new directors, the new directors are less likely to be aggressive 
monitors. Therefore, the alternative explanation could argue that the higher (lower) intensities of 
information-driven trades are not the result, but rather the cause of weaker (stronger) internal 
governance mechanisms. Although, a potential reverse causality in forms of influencing the board 
structure by a CEO who exploits nonpublic information, itself supports the role of board monitoring 
in mitigating informed trading by CEOs, a robustness analysis is conducted to rule out the potential 
reverse causality on the observed relationship in this study. 
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To test the reverse causality possibility, the impact of board monitoring on the level of 
CEOs' informed insider trading is examined on a subsample of insider trades by CEOs are less 
likely to be powerful enough to influence the board monitoring functions. More specifically, the 
subsample includes the trades conducted by CEOs with tenures shorter than two years at the time of 
the trade as CEO’s influence on internal governance mechanism grows with tenure. The selection of 
such a subsample alleviates the concern for the influence of CEOs on internal corporate governance 
structure since it is less likely for a recently appointed CEO to be powerful enough to influence 
internal governance structure.  
Equation (8), which examines the impact of board monitoring on the incidence of more 
significantly informed trades, is used for the test. In this model, the dependent variable is the 
proportion of the number of shares traded by a CEO in significantly informed trades to the total 
number of shares traded by the CEO within a year. Dependent variables are the same as those in the 
previous models. The results are in Table 17.   
The results in Table 17 confirm the results obtained on the full sample presented in 15. 
Specifically, the results indicate that board independence reduces the proportion of sell trades that 
are estimated to be based on more significantly informed insider trades. Moreover, the result for 
indicative variable between board independence and SOX confirms that the impact of board 
independence on reduction of more significantly informed sell trades decreased after SOX. The 
results for buy trades also confirm previous results. The results show a negative association between 
board independence and the proportion of more significantly informed trades; however the observed 
association is not statistically significant. Also the indicator variables between SOX and board 
independence show that the impact of board independence decreases for sell trades after SOX. The 
change for buy trades, however, is not statistically significant.  
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The results in Table 17 on duality indicate that the separation of the CEO and the COB 
positions is associated with lower proportions of significantly informed trades for the buy and sell 
trades. The results confirm previous results that the combination of CEO and COB positions is 
associated with higher proportions of more significantly informed trades. The results also indicate 
that the impact of being chairman of the board is more pronounced for new CEOs. The higher 
impact of duality status in the subsample of new CEOs can be attributed to their lack of influence 
on the board in comparison to older CEOs and the marginal power they get by presiding over the 
board. Furthermore, the indicator variables between duality and SOX show that SOX did not 
change the association between duality and intensity of insider trades, consistent with the result 
from the full sample of CEOs. 
Overall, the results of the robustness analyses support the hypothesis that higher levels of 
board independence and the separation of CEO and COB positions would result in lower levels of 
CEOs’ more significantly informed insider trades. Therefore, a potential reverse causality is 
rejected.  
 
5. Summary and Conclusion 
This study investigates the impact of several board characteristics on abnormal return and 
the incidence of insider trading by CEOs. The board characteristics are board independence, duality 
of the CEO and the chairman of the board, independent director’s multiple directorship and 
independent director stock ownership. This study also investigates the impact of SOX on abnormal 
return and on the incidence of insider trading by the CEOs, as well as its impact on the role of board 
characteristics in limiting the abuse of nonpublic information by the CEOs.  
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The board characteristics are postulated to influence the abnormal returns earned by CEOs 
on their insider trading as well as intensity of their trades. It is also postulated that SOX also 
influenced both the abnormal returns and the intensity of CEOs’ insider trades. Moreover, it is 
hypothesized that the role of internal governance mechanisms in reducing the abuse of nonpublic 
information by firms’ CEOs was partially replaced by SOX. 
This study analyzes open-market buy and sell trades by the CEOs. The abnormal returns 
earned by the CEOs are measured and treated as a proxy for underlying nonpublic information. The 
relationship between the measures of board monitoring and abnormal return of insider trades is 
estimated. Furthermore, using interactive variables between SOX and board monitoring measures, 
the interaction between SOX and internal governance mechanisms is investigated for buy and sell 
trades separately. In addition, the analyses are performed separately for pre- and post-SOX eras. 
Also, to investigate the differences in the impact of the board monitoring on insider trades with 
different levels of underlying nonpublic information, the trades, which are estimated to be more 
significantly informed based on their following abnormal returns are grouped and the results are 
compared with trades that are estimated to be based on less significant nonpublic information.   
Several robustness checks are conducted to support the validity of the results. The tests 
include alternative methods for the calculation of the abnormal returns, alternative regression 
approaches, various data subsamples and alternative explanations for the observed effects. The 
results proved to be robust.  
The results suggest that CEOs earn statistically and economically significant abnormal 
returns on both buy and sell trades. The results on sell trades are particularly interesting, since it was 
perceived that the level of abuse of nonpublic information is not significant for insider sell trades. 
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Many previous studies ignore insider sell trades and only focus on buy trades. Nonetheless, the 
results of this study confirm that the average abnormal return earned by CEOs on buy trades is 
significantly higher than that earned on sell trades. This result is consistent with the notion that sell 
trades also occur for purposes such as need for liquidity and wealth diversification, which may be 
less information-driven.  
The results of this study indicate that higher board independence reduces the abnormal 
returns of buy and sell trades. Furthermore, the results are stronger for trades with more significant 
underlying nonpublic information. The results also indicate that the limiting impact of board 
independence on abnormal returns decreased after SOX and that the impact of board independence 
is more robust on sell trades than on buy trades.  
The results for independent directors having multiple directorships are mixed. The results 
suggest that before SOX, multiple directorships are associated with higher abnormal returns for buy 
and sell trades. The observation is consistent with the "busy director hypothesis." The results for the 
indicative variable between multiple directorship variable and SOX binary variable indicates that 
the implementation of SOX did not significantly change the effect of multiple directorship for buy 
trades, while it weakened the effect for sell trades, as hypothesized. The post-SOX result for sell 
trades indicates that the impact of multiple directorships became consistent with "reputation 
hypothesis." 
The results for independent directors’ ownership show that higher ownership levels by 
independent directors is associated with higher abnormal returns on CEOs’ trades in the pre-SOX 
era. The results also indicate that the impact of directors’ ownership weakened after SOX for both 
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buy and sell categories. The results suggest that higher levels of equity ownership by independent 
directors made their interests more aligned with those of the CEOs before SOX. 
The results on duality indicate that the combination of CEO and COB positions is associated 
with higher abnormal returns for both buy and sell trades after SOX, but not before it. The results 
imply that the separation of CEO and COB is a complement mechanism, rather than a substitute 
one, for SOX. The results also show that SOX reduced the abnormal profits of both buy and sell 
trades significantly.  
The results for intensity of CEOs' trades indicate that higher board independence results in 
lower intensities of trades. Nonetheless, the results on intensity show different patterns on buy and 
sell trades. The weakening impact of SOX is only observed for sell trades. Furthermore, the results 
indicate that the impact of board independence is more significant on more significantly informed 
trades for sell trades, but not for buy trades.     
The results show no significant association between the number of directorships held by 
independent directors and the intensity of CEOs' buy trades. Also, the results do not show any 
statistically significant change in the impact of multiple directorships due to SOX. The results for 
sell trades, however, show a statistically significant association between multiple directorships and 
trade intensities such that it is observed that CEOs trade less intensively when independent directors 
on the board hold larger numbers of major external directorships. The observation, which is 
consistent with "reputation hypothesis," indicates that the presence of more highly qualified 
directors, as signaled by the number of held directorships, are associated with lower intensities of 
sell trades before SOX. As hypothesized the association weakened after SOX. 
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The results also show that higher levels of ownership by independent directors are 
associated with higher trade intensity by the CEOs for buy and sell trades. Nonetheless, the results 
weakened significantly after SOX. 
The results on duality show that the separation of CEO and COB positions is associated with 
lower trading intensities. The results also show that the implementation of SOX did not significantly 
affect the impact of duality status on the intensity of insider trades in either buy or sell trades. The 
results on the direct impact of SOX on the intensity of trades suggest that SOX significantly 
reduced buy and sell trades. 
The results also indicate that independent directors are particularly effective in mitigating 
more materially informed sell trades than buy trades. The observation can imply the relative 
ineffectiveness of the regulation in mitigating the abuse of nonpublic information in sell trades.   
Thus, the findings indicate that internal governance mechanisms are effective tools in 
reducing information asymmetry between insiders and outsiders. Furthermore, internal governance 
mechanisms are effective in reducing the use of nonpublic information in insider trades. Indeed, 
internal governance mechanisms can play substitute and complementary roles to regulation, 
depending on the type of trade, materiality of the underlying information, and the interaction of 
internal governance mechanisms with other sets of regulations.  
Although determining economic significance is subjective, the results of this study are 
economically significant. Board independence and the separation of the CEO and COB positions 
can each reduce the abnormal returns of firms’ CEOs by up to 5 percent. Furthermore, board 
independence can reduce the incidence of more materially informed trades by up to 10 percent.   
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The findings of this paper suggest that board monitoring can complement the existing 
regulation in mitigating the use of nonpublic information. The implication is that the board of 
directors can reduce information asymmetry between insiders and outsiders, reduce the abnormal 
return of insider trades, and reduce the opportunities a firm’s insiders have to abuse nonpublic 
information. This study establishes the oversight of insider trading as part of the board’s monitoring 
role. This study highlights the interaction between external and internal governance mechanisms on 
insider trading and contributes to the literature about the impact of SOX on corporate governance 
and insider trading.  
This study can be extended by investigating the impact of other governance mechanisms on 
insider trading by CEOs or other corporate insiders. Furthermore, additional research can 
investigate why some governance mechanisms are more influential on more materially informed 
trades while others may be more influential on less materially informed insider trades. Another 
extension to this study is to investigate the impact internal governance mechanisms have on non-
open-market transactions, such as options, gifts, and other grants. Also, the difference in the 
regulatory environment of industries such as financials and utilities can be explored to study the 
impact regulation can have on the role of internal governance mechanisms in the trading behavior of 
insiders. Finally, the suggested extensions can also be applied to insider trades by other types of 
firms.  
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Appendix A  
Insider Data Accuracy Levels 
 
This appendix reports Thomson Reuters cleansing criteria. Records with cleansing records equal to “S” and “A” are 
excluded in the sample. 
 
Cleanse 
Indicator 
Meaning 
R Data verified through the cleansing process.  
 
H Cleansed with a very high level of confidence. 
 
L One or more data cleansing actions were undertaken but secondary sources were unavailable for complete 
verification. 
 
I Some data elements were improved (inserted or replaced) to make the data usable. In some cases, records 
with a cleanse indicator of “I” may contain data that could not be verified or were determined to be outside 
of a reasonable range. 
 
C A record added to a non-derivative table or a derivative table to correspond with a record on the opposing 
table. 
 
W Indicates an improperly reported holdings record on the derivative table. This occurs when the insider 
reports a holding value in the number of derivatives or number of underlying shares field (and no value was 
reported for resulting derivatives held). 
 
Y An as-reported holdings value identified by data cleansing. 
 
S 
 
A 
No cleansing attempted; security does not meet our collection requirements.  
 
Numerous data elements were missing or invalid; reasonable assumptions could not be made. 
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Appendix B 
Insider Trading Sample Selection 
 
This table presents the details of data verification and sample selection steps for the sample. Data are for trades by firms’ 
CEOs from January1996 to December 2008. The data are from Thomson Reuters Insider Data database.  
 
Step  Data Number of 
excluded 
records  
Number of 
remained 
data 
records 
Notes 
1 All insider trading  by CEOs 
from 1996 to 2008 from 
Thomson Reuters Insiders 
Data database 
 
0 1,138,387 Cleansing codes include R, H, L, I, C, W, Y, S, 
A (all indicators are included) 
2 Exclude records with ‘A’ 
and ‘S’ indicators 
27,759 1,110,628 Records with indicators ‘A’ and ‘S’ are those 
records whose validity could not be verified by 
Thomson Reuters 
 
3 Exclude trades reported on 
forms 3, 5, and 144 
73,425 1,037,203 Form3 reports initial statement of beneficial 
ownership for all officers. Form4 reports 
changes in an insider’s ownership position 
including any purchase, sale, option grant, 
option exercise, gift, or any other transaction 
that causes a change in ownership position.  
Form5 reports activities for exempt 
transactions not required on a Form4 that 
include small transactions or small transfers 
within company plans.  
Form144 reports an insider’s declaration of 
intention to sell restricted stock and is only 
required for sellers of restricted stocks.  The 
declared trade may not be executed, however.  
 
4 Exclude records with 
transaction codes other 
than P and S  
455,876 581,327 P: Open market purchase of non-derivative or 
derivative security  
S: Open market sale of non-derivative or 
derivative security  
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Appendix C 
Breakdown of Cleansing Codes Per Year 
 
This table reports the breakdown of the cleansing indicator per year. The definitions of cleansing indicators are shown in 
Appendix B. The table below indicates that the proportion of records which could not be verified consistently decreased 
during the sample period. 
 
Year R (%) H(%) L(%) I(%) C(%) W(%) Y(%) S(%) A(%) 
1996 36.47 13.47 7.03 3.68 0.22 0 20.50 0.01 18.62 
1997 33.87 18.77 5.92 4.33 0.58 0 33.38 0.02 3.14 
1998 41.29 10.92 4.95 8.53 0.46 0 31.00 0.09 2.75 
1999 45.45 8.52 6.24 3.46 0.03 0 31.96 2.70 1.64 
2000 47.92 8.84 5.22 3.89 0.00 0 29.75 2.73 1.64 
2001 51.28 7.62 5.24 3.17 0.00 0 27.69 3.51 1.48 
2002 49.44 7.49 3.44 2.24 0.00 0 33.18 3.03 1.18 
2003 55.44 6.62 3.89 1.88 0.00 0 29.34 2.39 0.43 
2004 59.91 5.83 5.82 1.95 0.00 0 24.11 2.32 0.07 
2005 64.88 5.40 4.61 1.54 0.00 0 21.91 1.62 0.03 
2006 68.60 4.84 4.50 1.46 0.00 0 19.41 1.16 0.03 
2007 68.24 5.99 5.58 1.44 0.00 0 17.31 1.42 0.03 
2008 64.26 6.57 5.76 1.18 0.00 0 20.86 1.33 0.03 
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Appendix D 
Variable Definitions 
 
This appendix provides the definitions for the variables used in this study. CEOs’ trades are from Thomson Reuters Insider 
Trading database. Data for the boards of directors are from Risk Metrics. Data for stock prices and firm financial 
characteristics are from CRSP and Compustat respectively.  
 
Variable Definition 
Insider trades  
Profitability(CAR) Cumulative Abnormal Return earned during immediate 90 days following a trade 
 
Intensity The proportion of the number of total shares traded by a CEO in a year to the 
associated firm’s outstanding shares  
Proportion Proportion of the number of traded shares that are estimated to be based on more 
material nonpublic information, to the number of traded shares that are estimated 
to be based on less material nonpublic information  
Board characteristics  
Board Independence The proportion of the number of directors with independent status to the board size 
 
 Duality A binary variable that is equal to one when CEO and chairman of the board 
positions are held by the same individual and zero otherwise 
 
Outside Boards The average number of board seats in other major companied held by each 
director on a board  
 
Ownership  Total percentage of control voting power held by firm directors 
 
Control Variables 
 
Size Natural logarithm of firm total assets 
 
 
Book-to-Market Ratio The proportion of the book value of outstanding shares to the firm market value 
 
Outstanding Shares The number of common outstanding shares 
 
Liquidity The proportion of the number of shares traded in a year to the number of common 
shares outstanding in that year for a firm  
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Appendix E 
Directors Classification 
   
The appendix provides the details of classification of directors, as defined by Risk Metricks. 
 
Classification 
Directors can have one of the following board affiliations: Insiders / Employees (E), Affiliated Outsiders / Linked (L), or 
Independent Outsiders (I). These are defined as follows: 
Affiliated Director  
• 1. Inside Director (E)  
o 1.1. Employee of the company or one of its affiliates (i). 
o 1.2. Among the five most highly paid individuals (excluding interim CEO). 
o 1.3. Listed as an officer as defined under Section 16 of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 ("Section 
16 officer") (ii). 
o 1.4. Current interim CEO. 
o 1.5. Beneficial owner of more than 50 percent of the company's voting power (this may be aggregated if 
voting power is distributed among more than one member of a defined group). 
• 2. Affiliated Outside Director (L)  
o 2.1. Board Attestation  
 2.1.1. Board attestation that an outside director is not independent.  
o 2.2. Former CEO  
 2.2.1. Former CEO of the company (iii,iv). 
 2.2.2. Former CEO of an acquired company within the past five years (iv). 
 2.2.3. Former interim CEO if the service was longer than 18 months. If the service was between 
12 and 18 months an assessment of the interim CEO's employment agreement will be made 
(v). 
o 2.3. Non-CEO Executives  
 2.3.1. Former Section 16 officer (ii) of the company, an affiliate (i) or an acquired firm within the 
past five years. 
 2.3.2. Section 16 officer (ii) of a former parent or predecessor firm at the time the company was 
sold or split off from the parent/predecessor within the past five years. 
 2.3.3. Section 16 officer (ii), former Section 16 officer, or general or limited partner of a joint 
venture or partnership with the company. 
o 2.4. Family Members  
 2.4.1. Immediate family member (vi) of a current or former Section 16 officer (ii) of the company or 
its affiliates (i) within the last five years. 
 2.4.2. Immediate family member (vi) of a current employee of company or its affiliates (i) where 
additional factors raise concern (which may include, but are not limited to, the following: a 
director related to numerous employees; the company or its affiliates employ relatives of 
numerous board members; or a non-Section 16 officer in a key strategic role). 
o 2.5. Transactional, Professional, Financial, and Charitable Relationships  
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 2.5.1. Currently provides (or an immediate family member (vi) provides) professional services (vii) 
to the company, to an affiliate (i) of the company or an individual officer of the company or one 
of its affiliates in excess of $10,000 per year. 
 2.5.2. Is (or an immediate family member (vi) is) a partner in, or a controlling shareholder or an 
employee of, an organization that provides professional services (vii) to the company, to an 
affiliate of the company, or an individual officer of the company or one of its affiliates in excess 
of $10,000 per year. 
 2.5.3. Has (or an immediate family member(vi) has) any material transactional relationship (viii) 
with the company or its affiliates (i) (excluding investments in the company through a private 
placement). 
 2.5.4. Is (or an immediate family member (vi) is) a partner in, or a controlling shareholder or an 
executive officer of, an organization which has any material transactional relationship (viii) 
with the company or its affiliates (i) (excluding investments in the company through a private 
placement). 
 2.5.5. Is (or an immediate family member (vi) is) a trustee, director, or employee of a charitable or 
non-profit organization that receives material grants or endowments from the company or its 
affiliates (i). 
o 2.6. Other Relationships  
 2.6.1. Party to a voting agreement (ix) to vote in line with management on proposals being brought 
to shareholder vote. 
 2.6.2. Has (or an immediate family member (vi) has) an interlocking relationship as defined by the 
SEC involving members of the board of directors or its Compensation Committee (x). 
 2.6.3. Founder (xi) of the company but not currently an employee. 
 2.6.4. Any material (xii) relationship with the company. 
Independent Outside Director (I)  
• 1. No material (xii) connection to the company other than a board seat. 
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Appendix F 
Director Affiliation Status 
 
This table reports the overall distribution of directors based on their relationship with a firm in the sample. The 
independent ratio is the proportion of the number of directors with independent status to the total number of directors in a 
year.  
Year Number of 
directors 
Number of directors 
with independent 
status (percent of all 
directors) 
Number of directors 
with employee 
status (percent of all 
directors) 
Number of directors with 
linked or affiliated status 
(percent of all directors) 
 
1996 14867 8987 (60.45) 3236 (21.76) 2644 (17.78)  
1997 15631 9529 (60.97) 3501 (22.40) 2600 (16.63)  
1998 17048 10286 (60.34) 3794 (22.25) 2968 (17.41)  
1999 17420 10589 (60.83) 3806 (21.85) 3013 (17.29)  
2000 16675 10269 (61.58) 3627 (21.75) 2779 (16.66)  
2001 16669 10509 (63.05) 3551 (21.30) 2609 (15.65)  
2002 13499 8961 (66.38) 2663 (19.72) 1875 (13.89)  
2003 13792 9490 (68.81) 2533 (18.36) 1769 (12.83)  
2004 13820 9755 (70.59) 2445 (17.69) 1620 (11.72)  
2005 13582 9743 (71.75) 2293 (16.88) 1543 (11.36)  
2006 13372 9651 (72.17) 2164 (16.18) 1556 (11.64)  
2007 13338 10320 (77.37) 2157 (16.17) 852 (6.38)  
2008 13754 10733 (78.04) 2159 (15.69) 862 (8.27)  
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Appendix G 
Correlation Matrix 
This table shows the correlation between explanatory and control variables used in the models. Significance levels for 1%, 5%, and 10% levels are marked by ***, **, 
and * respectively.  
Panel A. Buy trades 
 CAR Board 
Independence 
Duality Multiple 
Directorship 
Independent 
Director 
Ownership  
Size B/M Liquidity 
CAR 1.0000        
Board Independence 0.0247* 1.0000       
Duality -0.0020 -0.0627*** 1.0000      
Multiple Directorship -0.0075 0.1895*** 0.0050 1.0000    
 Director Ownership 0.0345** 0.0854*** -0.0674 0.0292** 1.0000    
Size -0.0703*** 0.0962*** 0.1527*** 0.1647*** -0.0206 1.0000   
B/M -0.0079 0.0383*** -0.0426*** -0.0383*** 0.0090 0.0002 1.0000  
Liquidity -0.0027 -0.0286** 0.0097 -0.0154 -0.0034 0.0077 -0.0090* 1.0000 
 
Panel B. Sell trades 
 CAR Board 
Independence 
Duality Multiple 
Directorship 
Independent 
Director 
Ownership  
Size B/M Liquidity 
CAR 1.0000        
Board Independence 0.0162*** 1.0000       
Duality -0.0202*** 0.0880*** 1.0000      
Multiple Directorship 0.0089 0.1324*** 0.0140** 1.0000     
Director Ownership 0.0014 0.0791*** -0.0456*** -0.0051 1.0000    
Size 0.0816*** 0.1145*** 0.0659*** 0.3462*** -0.0306*** 1.0000   
B/M 0.0001 0.0407*** -0.0040 -0.0110* 0.0242*** -0.0025 1.0000  
Liquidity -0.1121*** 0.0738*** -0.0606*** -0.0043 -0.0488*** -0.0036 -0.0150*** 1.0000 
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Appendix H  
Figures and Tables 
 
 
Figure1 
Frequency of Buy and Sell Trades by CEOs 
 
This figure shows the trend of the number of transactions for both buy (acquisition) and sell (disposition) trades from 
1996 to 2008. Trades flagged as A are buy (acquisition) trades and trades flagged as D are sell (disposition) trades.  
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Table 1 
Breakdown of Insider Trades Based on Transaction Type 
 
This table presents the frequency and percentage of each transaction code in the sample. The sample includes all insider trading 
transactions by firm CEOs from January 1996 through December 2008 that are reported to the SEC through Form4. The data are 
from Thomson Reuters Insider database. Records whose validity were not confirmed by Thomson Reuters are excluded from the 
sample. 
 
Panel A. Transaction type Frequency Percent 
 
General transaction code 
 
P-Open market or private purchase of non-derivative or derivative 
security 
98,894 17.01 
S- Open market or private sell of non-derivative or derivative 
security 
482,433 82.99 
V- Transaction voluntarily reported earlier than required 0 0.00 
 
  
   
Panel B. Number of distinct firms  Frequency  
 
No. of distinct firms 
 
11,183 
 
No. of distinct firms with buy trades 8,219  
No. of distinct firms with sell trades 7,063  
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Table 2 
Trades Summary Statistics  
 
This table presents the summary statistics for the number of shares traded and the size of each individual trade by CEOs reported on 
Form4 from January 1996 through December 2008. The figures are reported for all trades, buy trades and sell trades separately. 
 
 Mean 25th 
percentile 
Median 75th 
percentile 
Std. dev. 
     
Number of Traded Shares 
(000s) 
     
All trades 30.2 0.2 0.8 4.0 1557 
Buy trades 81.8 0.5 1.7 5.5 3609 
Sell trades 19.6 0.2 0.6 3.3 500 
 
Transaction Volume (000s ) 
     
All trades 9,357 5.5 18.7 76.3 3.5E+6 
Buy trades 32,395 2.3 8.5 33.2 8.6E+6 
Sell trades 1,540 6.6 21.4 88.7 6.1E+5 
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Table 3 
Breakdown of Trade Volume Based on Year and Sector  
This table reports the trade volumes by industry and year. The table is intended to provide a better view of the distribution of buy and sell trades by CEOs in various sectors from 
January 1996 through December 2008. The reported values are in millions. Sectors are defined by Thomson Reuters.  
 
Panel A. Buy Trades 
 
 Finance Healthcare Consumer 
non 
durable 
Consumer 
services 
Consumer 
durables 
Energy Transport. Technology Basic 
industries 
Capital 
goods   
Public 
utilities 
Misc. Unclas
sified 
Total 
1996 110 44 16 229 13 14 3 81 46 43 28 7 3642 4276 
1997 202 76 52 240 8 30 9 75 34 43 39 4 37 849 
1998 648 91 63 116 13 282 17 122 32 233 165 8 31 1821 
1999 335 349 171 633 115 16 22 114 31 62 95 8 23 1974 
2000 223 46 18 593 10 33 14 235 34 39 34 5 38 1322 
2001 79 38 11 79 20 40 3 72 9 13 15 0 30 409 
2002 2380 37 27 369 7 11 2 97 11 27 29 0 79 3076 
2003 247 34 26 126 7 19 1 37 5 163 5 5 28 703 
2004 131 37 17 78 6 32 10 57 6 7 3 0 21 405 
2005 92 106 8 78 56 156 21 28 58 18 197 0 22 840 
2006 126 130 25 140 212 126 5 46 67 12 2 0 19 910 
2007 229 214 15 92 14 187 2 73 43 37 3 0 34 943 
2008 299 119 28 244 6 404 42 276 42 37 10 0 64 1571 
Total 5101 1321 477 3017 487 1350 151 1313 418 734 625 37 4068  19099 
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Panel B. Sell Trades 
 
 Finance  Healthcare  Consumer 
non 
durable  
Consumer 
services  
Consumer 
durables 
Energy Transport
. 
Technology Basic 
industries 
Capital 
goods 
Public 
utilities 
Misc. Unclas
sified 
Total 
1996 190 678 234 1532 203 162 133 4643 53 322 11 22 565 8748 
1997 619 541 291 1799 124 298 61 2842 166 228 126 14 1054 8163 
1998 872 598 357 2885 383 83 126 5125 63 375 185 39 205 11296 
1999 1012 649 405 2791 60 847 112 9399 102 443 11788 16 452 28076 
2000 556 1566 190 2496 223 486 88 9964 75 504 364 48 327 16887 
2001 658 1158 345 2645 172 455 446 3850 100 359 189 7 70 10454 
2002 465 797 455 2010 257 115 101 1261 112 162 75 3 637 6450 
2003 949 798 933 2109 509 143 101 4302 187 284 60 1 54 10430 
2004 1186 1774 847 3239 682 417 183 3286 551 609 204 3 71 13052 
2005 1564 1428 630 2456 617 1081 151 4467 735 563 323 2 60 14077 
2006 2056 1465 869 5083 256 1475 272 3233 545 883 255 21 49 16462 
2007 1762 1438 811 2092 405 915 171 4040 553 1354 396 49 49 14035 
2008 1192 865 375 1396 209 1399 195 1754 397 782 222 0 34 8820 
Total 13081 13755 6742 32533 4100 7876 2140 58166 3639 6868 14198 225 3627  166950 
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Table 4 
Board and CEO Characteristics 
 
This table presents the summary statistics for board characteristics that influence the board’s ability to monitor the CEO’s trading 
activities. In Panel A, Board Independence is the percentage of the number of independent directors to the total board size in a firm. 
Outside Boards is the average number of major board seats held by independent directors of a firm. Ownership is the combined 
percentage of stocks controlled by independent directors in a firm. Duality is a binary variable, which is equal to one when CEO and 
chairman of the board positions are occupied by the same individual and zero otherwise. The mean value for Duality represents the 
proportion of firms in which CEO and chairman positions are occupied by the same individual. Panel B reports the number of 
outside boards, stock ownership, and tenure for CEOs who reported at least one buy or sell trade during the sample time period. 
 
Mean 25th percentile Median 75th percentile Std dev 
 
Panel A. Board 
Characteristics 
     
Board Independence 66.18 55.55 69.23 80.00 17.77 
Outside Boards 0.93 0.33 0.83 1.33 0.72 
Ownership 1.32 0 0.0 0.0 5.60 
Duality 0.64 - - - - 
 
Panel B. CEO Characteristics 
     
Outside Board 0.60 0 0 1 0.92 
Ownership 4.97 0 1.50 3.80 11.24 
Tenure 10.62 4 8 14 28.00 
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Table 5 
Firm Characteristics Summary Statistics 
 
This table reports summary statistics for firms in the sample. The data, which are from Compustat, include  firm Size (measured as 
Total Assets), Number of Common Shares Outstanding, Number of Common Shares Traded, Book-to-Market Ratio (measured as 
Book Value of Equity divided by Market Value of Equity), and Market Value (measured as the number of outstanding shares 
multiplied by stock price at the end of firms' fiscal years). Firm characteristics are reported separately for buy and sell trades. 
 
 Mean 25th percentile Median 75th percentile Std. dev. 
Panel A. Buy Trades 
 
     
Size ( $Million) 3437 54.76 243.66 882.70 44331 
      
B/M 1.25 0.32 0.61 1.03 63 
      
Common Shares 
Outstanding,( million) 
 
53.35 7.86 16.77 38.05 295 
Annual Common Shares 
Traded (million) 
 
85.74 3.7 14.1 50.1 483 
Market Value ($ million) 1219.98 34.98 114.20 427.25 10871.84 
 
Panel B. Sell Trades 
 
     
Size ( $ million) 
 
5451.43 135.63 497.14 1948.87 36332 
B/M 
 
0.25 0.22 0.38 0.60 10 
Common Shares 
Outstanding,( million) 
 
109.02 13.68 29.86 70.04 391 
Annual Common Shares 
Traded (million) 
 
228.85 15.53 55.82 166.71 765 
Market Value ($ million) 4538.82 205.00 672.91 2204.52 17676 
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Table 6  
CEO Insider Trades Abnormal Returns  
 
This table presents the summary statistics for abnormal returns earned by firm CEOs from January 1996 through December 2008. 
The proportion of trades with favorable return (positive abnormal return for buy trades and negative abnormal returns for sell 
trades) are reported for each category. Abnormal returns are calculated using the Fama-French 4-Factor model for a 90-day window 
following each trade. The estimation period for the Fama-French 4-Factor model starts from 250 days before a trade takes place and 
ends 10 days before the trade. The factors needed for the Fama-French model are obtained from French’s Web site 
(http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french). Due to the possibility that trades executed in one day may be reported 
collectively or separately, only one transaction per day is considered for the statistics. 
  
 
N Mean (%) 25th pct. 
(%) 
Median 
(%) 
75th pct 
(%) 
Std. dev. 
(%) 
No. of trades with 
positive (negative) 
CAR for buy (sell) 
trades (% of total 
trades) 
 
Buy 41,710 14.66*** -11.63 9.46 36.54 59.62 25,685 (61.57%) 
 
Sell  83,083 -6.05*** -27.08 -6.08 14.51 54.47 49,167 (59.18%) 
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Table 7 
Test of Equality of CAR Means Based on Size and B/M Ratio 
 
This table presents the test of equality of means for large versus small firms and value versus growth firms. Median value for size and 
the B/M ratio of the firms in the sample are the cutoff values for the categorization. Size is measured as the value of total assets, and the 
B/M ratio is measured as the book value of equity to market value of equity. Only one trade per distinct date is considered for this table. 
T-statistics and corresponding p-value for the test of mean equality is also reported.  
 
 
 Larger firms 
(>median Size) 
Smaller firms 
(<median Size) 
T-Stat (p-
value) 
Value firms (> 
median B/M) 
Growth firms 
(<median B/M) 
T-Stat (p-value) 
Buy trades 
 
 
0.1323 
(0.3881) 
 
(# of obs.: 
6292) 
 
0.1866 
(0.8717) 
 
(# of obs.: 
7168) 
4.5603 
 (0.0001) 
0.1835  
(0.4342) 
 
(# of obs.: 
5165) 
0.1473 
(0.8089) 
 
(# of obs.: 
8295) 
2.9615 
(0.0031) 
Sell trades -0.0612 
(0.3617) 
 
(# of obs.: 
10002) 
-0.1543 
(0.6037) 
 
(# of obs.:. 
6368) 
12.3334 
(0.0001) 
-0.0541 
(0.4054) 
 
(# of obs.: 
3035) 
-0.1073 
(0.4866) 
 
(# of obs.: 
13335) 
5.5971(0.0001) 
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Table 8 
Internal Corporate Governance and Abnormal Return of Insider Trades 
This table presents the results for the OLS regression of equation (5). The dependent variable is the CAR over a 90-day window following each trade by CEOs from January 1996 
through December 2008. Abnormal returns are calculated through the Fama-French 4-factor model. Explanatory variables include Board Independence, measured as the proportion 
of the number of independent directors to entire board size; Duality, a binary variable that is equal to one when the CEO and chairman of the board are the same individual and 
zero otherwise; Multiple Directorship, measured as the average number of outside directorships held by each independent director on the board; and Director Ownership, measured 
as the total percentage of shares held by independent directors on a board to the number of the firm’s outstanding shares. Control variables are Size, as the natural logarithm of total 
assets, the B/M ratio, as the book to market value of the equity, and Liquidity, as the proportion of annual traded shares to the number of shares outstanding in the firm. SOX is a 
binary variable, which is equal to one if the transaction date is after the SOX implementation date and zero otherwise.  
 
 Buy Buy Buy Buy Buy Sell Sell Sell Sell Sell 
Constant 94.0424*** (24.4329) 
62.8166*** 
(24.4036) 
92.2203*** 
(24.4175) 
86.5457*** 
(8.8959) 
74.1479*** 
(9.5459) 
-9.4761*** 
(2.7073) 
-7.3634*** 
(2.6676) 
-8.8166** 
(2.7751) 
-25.2970*** 
(3.5391) 
-13.8157*** 
(3.8345) 
Board 
Independence 
0.0110 
(0.0279) 
   0.0222 
(0.0308) 
0.0350*** 
(0.0104) 
 
  0.0232* 
(0.0134) 
Duality  1.2698 (1.0597) 
  0.8423 
(1.1593) 
 -0.6271* 
(0.3469) 
 
 -0.4309* 
(0.3444) 
Multiple 
Directorship  
  -1.1693* 
(0.7157) 
 -1.3757* 
(0.7847) 
  -0.4157 
(0.2651) 
 -0.9874*** 
(0.3436) 
Directors 
Ownership 
   0.2026** 
(0.0983) 
0.1966* 
(0.1012) 
   -0.1538*** 
(0.0339) 
-0.1479*** 
(0.0332) 
Size -2.4302*** (0.3039) 
-2.3363*** 
(0.3651) 
-2.2238*** 
(0.3743) 
-2.8778*** 
(0.4017) 
-2.6398*** 
(0.4319) 
0.3643*** 
(0.1127) 
0.3450*** 
(0.1134) 
0.4494*** 
(0.1237) 
0.5197*** 
(0.1467) 
0.7049*** 
(0.1636) 
B/M Ratio -0.3336*** (0.0735) 
-0.3311*** 
(0.0735) 
-0.3351*** 
(0.0735) 
-0.3342*** 
(0.0759) 
-0.3375*** 
(0.0757) 
-0.5374*** 
(0.1561) 
-0.5322*** 
(0.1565) 
-0.5395*** 
(0.1562) 
-0.3995** 
(0.1726) 
-0.3633** 
(0.1724) 
Liquidity 1.2746*** (0.3039) 
1.2396*** 
(0.3102) 
1.2716*** 
(0.3039) 
1.6139*** 
(0.3428) 
1.5819*** 
(0.3468) 
-1.0571*** 
(0.0680) 
-1.0156*** 
(0.0683) 
-1.0442*** 
(0.0679) 
-0.9168*** 
(0.0827) 
-0.8835*** 
(0.0830) 
SOX -67.1815*** (3.2934) 
-47.9311*** 
(3.1478) 
-67.5885*** 
(3.1028) 
-40.3673*** 
(5.3064) 
-41.4710*** 
(5.3716) 
22.0411*** 
(0.9032) 
11.7936*** 
(0.8675) 
22.5979*** 
(0.8872) 
17.4567*** 
(1.1770) 
12.7233*** 
(1.2891) 
Observations 4,791 4,609 4,791 4,276 4,136 27,390 26,907 27,390 
 
19,617 19,239 
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R-Square 0.2730 0.2767 0.2734 0.2429 0.2505 0.3513 0.3509 0.3511 0.3012 0.3057 
Prob. >F Stat. 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Significant at 1% (***), 5% (**), and 10% (*) levels.  
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Table 9  
Impacts of SOX on the Effectiveness of Internal Governance Mechanisms 
This table presents the influence of SOX on the relation between internal governance mechanisms and abnormal return of CEOs’ insider trading from January 1996 through 
December 2008 through an OLS regression of equation (6). The dependent variable is the CAR over a 90-day window following each trade. Abnormal returns are calculated by the 
Fama-French 4-factor model. Explanatory variables are board independence, measured as the proportion of number of independent directors to entire board size; Duality, a binary 
variable which is equal to one when the CEO and chairman of the board are the same individual; Multiple Directorship, measured as average number of outside directorships by 
independent directors; and Director Ownership as the total stock ownership (as a percent of outstanding shares) by independent directors. Size is measured as a natural logarithm of 
total assets; the B/M ratio is the book to market value of equity; and Liquidity is the proportion of annual traded shares to total number of share outstanding. SOX is equal to one if 
transaction date is after SOX implementation date and zero otherwise. Interactive variables between regulation variables (SOX) and the internal governance measures represent the 
change in impact of the governance mechanisms due to SOX. 
 
 Buy Buy Buy Buy Sell Sell Sell Sell 
Constant 69.0089*** (25.1914) 
63.3303*** 
(24.3879) 
92.5445*** 
(24.4267) 
86.3808*** 
(8.8944) 
-8.6831*** 
(2.8309) 
-9.3929** 
(2.7012) 
-24.8420*** 
(2.8130) 
-24.5839*** 
(3.5362) 
Independence 0.0089 (0.0302) 
   0.0262* 
(0.0138) 
   
Duality  -0.6833 (1.2853) 
   2.5806 
(0.5407) 
  
Multiple 
Directorship 
  1.0957* 
(0.6120) 
   -1.4885*** 
(0.3566) 
 
Ownership    0.2935*** (0.1117) 
   -0.4263*** 
(0.0517) 
Size -2.4315*** (0.3548) 
-2.3720*** 
(0.3652) 
-2.2515*** 
(0.3779) 
-2.8826*** 
(0.4016) 
0.3532*** 
(0.1133) 
0.3711*** 
(0.1134) 
0.4459** 
(0.1237) 
0.4878*** 
(0.1466) 
B/M Ratio -0.3335*** (0.0735) 
-0.3382*** 
(0.0735) 
-0.3361*** 
(0.0735) 
-0.3335*** 
(0.0780) 
-0.5354*** 
(0.1561) 
-0.5087*** 
(0.1565) 
-0.5292*** 
(0.1561) 
-0.3872** 
(0.1723) 
Liquidity 1.2737*** (0.3040) 
1.2082*** 
(0.3102) 
1.2701*** 
(0.3039) 
1.7040*** 
(0.3468) 
-1.0575*** 
(0.0680) 
-1.0160*** 
(0.0682) 
-1.0442*** 
(0.0679) 
-0.9156*** 
(0.0826) 
SOX  -51.4377*** (3.4067) 
-68.1172*** 
(3.2543) 
-39.6351*** 
(5.3224) 
 13.8986*** 
(0.9756) 
37.6954*** 
(1.0042) 
14.3010*** 
(1.1842) 
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SOX * 
Independence 
0.0131 
(0.0747) 
   -0.0034* 
(0.0189) 
   
SOX * Duality  5.8830** (2.1954) 
   -3.2937*** 
(0.6995) 
  
SOX * Multiple 
Directors 
  0.9019 
(1.6733) 
   2.1662*** 
(0.4817) 
 
SOX * Ownership    -0.4091* (0.2387) 
   0.4774*** 
(0.0683) 
Observations 4,791 4,609 4,791 4,276 27,390 26,907 27,390 19,617 
R-Square 0.2730 0.2779 0.2734 0.2435 0.3513 0.3515 0.3516 0.3030 
Prob.>F Stat. 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Significant at 1% (***), 5% (**), and 10% (*) levels.  
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Table 10 
Impacts of SOX on the Effectiveness of Internal Governance Mechanisms by Separate Regressions  
This table presents the influence of SOX on the relationship between internal governance mechanisms and abnormal return of CEOs’ 
insider trading from January 1996 through December 2008 through an OLS regression of equation (6) separately for before- and after-
SOX eras. The dependent variable is the CAR over a 90-day window following each trade. Abnormal returns are calculated by the 
Fama-French 4-factor model. Explanatory variables are board independence, measured as the proportion of the number of independent 
directors to entire board size; Duality, a binary variable which is equal to one when the CEO and chairman of the board are the same 
individual; Multiple Directorship, measured as average number of outside directorships by independent directors; and Director 
Ownership, as the total stock ownership (as a percent of outstanding shares) by independent directors. Size is measured as natural 
logarithm of total assets, the B/M ratio is the book to market value of equity and Liquidity is the proportion of annual traded shares to 
total number of share outstanding. T-stat and corresponding p-value show the result for the test of equality of variables of interest for 
before- and after-SOX periods. 
 
Pre-SOX buy Post-SOX 
buy 
t-test 
(p-value) 
Pre-SOX sell Post-SOX sell t-test 
(p-value) 
Constant 70.8579*** (11.0057) 
36.4776* 
(20.8813) 
 -0.4146 
(5.7663) 
-51.2317*** 
(4.6426) 
 
Board 
Independence 
0.0124 
(0.0332) 
0.1616 
(0.1134) 
1.08 
(0.2816) 
0.0271** 
(0.0133) 
0.0181* 
(0.0104) 
0.54 
(0.5913) 
Duality 0.0358 (1.3716) 
4.4379** 
(2.1217) 
1.94 
(0.0528) 
0.7057 
(0.6966) 
-2.454*** 
(0.5195) 
-2.91 
(0.0036) 
Multiple 
Directorship 
1.3229* 
(0.6014) 
-1.5652 
(1.9833) 
-0.42 
(0.6714) 
-1.3361*** 
(0.4830) 
-0.1330 
(0.4613) 
3.62 
(0.0003) 
Directors 
ownership 
0.2559** 
(0.1201) 
-0.0031 
(0.2084) 
-1.13 
(0.2601) 
-0.4269*** 
(0.0602) 
0.1127*** 
(0.0348) 
0.4627 
(0.0688) 
Size -2.7594*** (0.5106) 
-1.2115 
(0.8175) 
 0.0958 
(0.2446) 
1.5734*** 
(0.1977) 
 
B/M Ratio -0.3293*** (0.0779) 
0.9557 
(1.6546) 
 -1.5870* 
(0.2003) 
-4.1727*** 
(0.8993) 
 
Liquidity 1.7707*** (0.4542) 
0.5040 
(0.5881) 
 -1.1807*** 
(0.1169) 
-0.1282 
(0.1154) 
 
Observations 3196 940  10,973 8,266  
R-Square 0.2451 0.3106  0.2757 0.3833  
Prob > F 0.0000 0.0000  0.0000 0.0000  
Significant at 1% (***), 5% (**), and 10% (*) levels.  
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Table 11 
Internal Corporate Governance and Significance of Underlying Information  
This table presents the influence of SOX on the relationship between internal governance mechanisms and abnormal return of CEOs’ insider trading from January 1996 through 
December 2008 through equation (6) OLS regression. The sample for this regression includes buy trades with positive abnormal return and sell trades with negative abnormal 
return. The dependent variable is the CAR over a 90-day window following each trade. Abnormal returns are calculated by the Fama-French 4-factor model. Explanatory 
variables include board independence, measured as the proportion of the number of independent directors to entire board size; Duality, a binary variable which is equal to one 
when the CEO and chairman of the board are the same individual and zero otherwise; Multiple Directorship, measured as the average number of outside directorships held by 
each director; and Director Ownership, measured as the total percentage of stocks held by independent directors. Control variables include Size, as the natural logarithm of total 
assets; the B/M ratio, as the book value of equity to the market value of equity; and Liquidity, as the proportion of annual traded shares to share outstanding. SOX is a binary 
variable equal to one if transaction date is after the SOX implementation date and zero otherwise. Interactive variables between regulation variables (SOX) and internal 
governance measures represent the change in the impact of governance mechanisms due to SOX.  
 
 Buy Buy Buy Buy Sell Sell Sell Sell 
Constant 104.977*** 
(9.0675) 
99.0128*** 
(9.0875) 
99.3181*** 
(9.2788) 
127.8165*** 
(9.3589) 
-32.7623*** 
(2.6084) 
-34.3411*** 
(2.51157) 
-41.5817*** 
(2.5704) 
-43.7687*** 
(3.4966) 
Independence -0.0393* 
(0.0247) 
 
  0.0487*** 
(0.0130) 
   
Duality  -0.7816 
(1.3535) 
 
  -0.2122 
(0.5363) 
  
Multiple 
Directorship 
  
-0.6390 
(0.8168) 
 
  0.3240 
(0.3488) 
 
Ownership    0.2614** (0.1090) 
   -02853*** 
(0.0424) 
Size -3.6578*** (0.3996) 
-3.5501*** 
(0.4068) 
-3.4576*** 
(0.4233) 
-4.1831*** 
(0.4246) 
-0.8766*** 
(0.1011) 
0.8616*** 
(0.1010) 
0.7498*** 
(0.1094) 
1.0210*** 
(0.1439) 
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B/M Ratio -0.2051** (0.0651) 
-0.2170** 
(0.0651) 
-0.2123** 
(0.0651) 
-0.2078** 
(0.0673) 
-0.0611*** 
(0.1059) 
-0.0470 
(0.1081) 
-0.0506 
(0.1081) 
-0.0388 
(0.1202) 
Liquidity 2.7124*** (0.3084) 
2.6572*** 
(0.3266) 
2.7328*** 
(0.3185) 
3.1510*** 
(0.3495) 
-1.1341*** 
(0.0614) 
-1.2645*** 
(0.0612) 
-1.3020*** 
(0.0614) 
-1.1790*** 
(0.0748) 
SOX -38.851*** (10.1290) 
-36.2215*** 
(8.2524) 
-29.6310*** 
(5.0534) 
-25.3625*** 
(14.0457) 
 5.0215*** 
(1.2084) 
9.9638*** 
(0.8909) 
11.7873*** 
(1.2750) 
SOX * 
Independence 
0.0531* 
(0.366) 
   -0.0143* 
(0.0081) 
   
SOX * Duality  4.3875** (2.3874) 
   -0.9338* 
(0.4877) 
  
SOX * Multiple 
Directorship 
  -1.8029 
(1.8113) 
   0.5780* 
(0.2019) 
 
SOX * 
Ownership 
   -0.3371 
(0.2531) 
   0.2931*** 
(0.0602) 
Observations 3,217 3,089 3,217 2,982 15,520 15,207 15,520 9,456 
R-Square 0.1917 0.2015 0.1915 0.1902 0.1819 0.1811 0.1813 0.1946 
Prob.> F Stat. 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Significant at 1% (***), 5% (**), and 10% (*) levels. 
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Table 12 
Internal Corporate Governance and Materiality of Underlying Information by Separate Regressions 
This table presents the influence of SOX and financial regulation on the relationship between internal governance mechanisms and 
abnormal return of CEOs’ insider trading from January 1996 through December 2008 through an OLS regression of equation (6). The 
dependent variable is the CAR over a 90-day window following each trade. Abnormal returns are calculated by a Fama-French 4-factor 
model. Explanatory variables include board independence, measured as the proportion of independent directors to entire board size; 
Duality, a binary variable which is equal to one when the CEO and chairman of the board are the same individual; Multiple 
Directorship, measured as average outside directorships held by each director; and Director Ownership as the total share ownership by 
independent directors. Control variables include Size, as the natural logarithm of total assets; the B/M ratio, as the book value of equity 
to the market value of equity; and Liquidity, as the proportion of annual traded shares to shares outstanding. To test a hypothesis of 
equality of results coefficients for internal governance mechanisms, a t-test is used and the results for the t-test and correspondent p-
value are reported. 
 Pre-SOX buy Post-SOX 
buy 
t-test 
(p-value) 
Pre-SOX sell Post-SOX 
sell 
t-test 
(p-value) 
Constant 121.3837*** (11.8172) 
36.9256* 
(20.8222) 
 -39.6562*** 
(6.1090) 
-30.3165*** 
(4.486) 
 
Board 
Independence 
-0.0467* 
(0.0236) 
0.2681*** 
(0.1014) 
1.99 
(0.0462) 
0.0485** 
(0.0191) 
0.0297* 
(0.0162) 
-2.40 
(0.0163) 
Duality -0.3341 (1.4082) 
3.6361* 
(2.1962) 
1.78 
(0.0745) 
-1.2173* 
(0.7455) 
-0.9953* 
(0.4449) 
-0.10 
(0.9178) 
Multiple 
Directorship 
-0.2610 
(0.8831) 
-5.0995** 
(2.0592) 
-1.85 
(0.0643) 
0.1922 
(0.5106) 
1.3701*** 
(0.3901) 
2.16 
(0.0312) 
Directors 
Ownership 
0.2242* 
(0.1170) 
0.0273 
(0.2322) 
-0.73 
(0.4651) 
-0.3042*** 
(0.0532) 
0.0252 
(0.0313) 
5.14 
(0.0001) 
Size -4.3302 (0.5449) 
-3.4166*** 
(0.8425) 
 0.9698*** 
(0.2548) 
0.9118*** 
(0.1707) 
 
B/M Ratio -0.2190*** (0.0674) 
-0.8713 
(1.7064) 
 -0.0265 
(0.1467) 
-1.7079* 
(0.8545) 
 
Liquidity 2.8801*** (0.4460) 
2.4031 
(0.6185) 
 -1.16663 
(0.1155) 
-1.2355*** 
(0.1041) 
 
Observations 2,173 699  4,930 4,273  
R-Square 0.2247 0.1919  0.1511 0.2293  
Prob. > F 0.0000 0.0000  0.0000 0.0000  
Significant at 1% (***), 5% (**), and 10% (*) levels.  
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Table 13 
Intensity of Insider Trades and Internal Governance Mechanisms 
This table presents the relationship between the internal governance mechanisms and the intensity of trades by the CEOs by running an OLS regression on equation (7) on the full 
sample. Intensity is the natural logarithm of the proportion of total shares traded by a CEO in a year to the number of firm’s outstanding shares. Explanatory variables include 
Board Independence, measured as the proportion of the number of independent directors to entire board size; Duality, a binary variable which is equal to one when the CEO and 
chairman of the board are the same individual and zero otherwise; Multiple Directorship, measured as the average number of outside directorships held by each director; and 
Director Ownership, measured as the total percentage of stocks held by independent directors. Control variables include Size, as the natural logarithm of total assets; the B/M ratio, 
as the book value of equity to the market value of equity; and Liquidity, as the proportion of annual traded shares to share outstanding. SOX is a binary variable equal to one if 
transaction date is after the SOX implementation date and zero otherwise. Interactive variables between regulation variables (SOX) and internal governance measures represent the 
change in impact of governance mechanisms due to SOX. 
 
Buy Buy Buy  Buy Buy Sell Sell Sell Sell Sell 
Constant 8.6574*** (0.7790) 
8.1517*** 
(0.7760) 
7.5199*** 
(0.7926) 
7.2570*** 
(0.7922) 
7.5879*** 
(0.8661) 
8.2415*** 
(0.3803) 
8.0848*** 
(0.3552) 
7.3594*** 
(0.3829) 
7.5044*** 
(0.3733) 
7.3476*** 
(0.4325) 
Independence -0.0139*** (0.0030) 
   -0.0113*** 
(0.0033) 
-0.0130*** 
(0.0019) 
   -0.0085*** 
(0.0021) 
Duality  0.4235*** (0.1194) 
  0.4093*** 
(0.1193) 
 0.3627*** 
(0.0745) 
  0.4032*** 
(0.0748) 
Multiple Directors   -0.0588 (0.0893) 
 0.0143 
(0.0924) 
  -0.3342*** 
(0.0566) 
 -0.2302*** 
(0.0599) 
Directors Ownership    0.0079*** (0.0025) 
0.0063** 
(0.0028) 
   0.0119*** 
(0.0016) 
0.0090*** 
(0.0017) 
Size -0.5697*** (0.0301) 
-0.6003*** 
(0.0309) 
-0.5395*** 
(0.0332) 
-0.5501*** 
(0.0316) 
-0.5415*** 
(0.0355) 
-0.4843*** 
(0.0153) 
-0.5079*** 
(0.0153) 
-0.4467*** 
(0.0174) 
-0.4645*** 
(0.0163) 
-0.4352*** 
(0.0185) 
B/M -0.0137 (0.0115) 
-0.0139 
(0.0115) 
-0.0143 
(0.0115) 
-0.0149 
(0.0115) 
0.0131 
(0.0114) 
-0.0195* 
(0.0100) 
-0.0197** 
(0.0099) 
-0.0202** 
(0.0100) 
-0.0198** 
(0.0100) 
-0.0191* 
(0.0099) 
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Liquidity 0.1769*** (0.0269) 
0.1648*** 
(0.0277) 
0.1792*** 
(0.0270) 
0.1818*** 
(0.0281) 
0.1718*** 
(0.0284) 
0.0988*** 
(0.0102) 
0.0938*** 
(0.0102) 
0.0955*** 
(0.0101) 
0.1019*** 
(0.0104) 
0.0986*** 
(0.0104) 
SOX -0.4481 (0.4989) 
-0.1732 
(0.2722) 
-0.3359 
(0.2649) 
0.2275 
(0.2743) 
  0.2266* 
(0.1271) 
 0.4047*** 
(0.1105) 
-0.3685 
(0.2492) 
SOX * Independence 0.0010 (0.0062) 
   -0.0006 
(0.0076) 
0.0112*** 
(0.0028) 
   0.0071** 
(0.0032) 
SOX * Duality  0.0782 (0.1846) 
  0.0907 
(0.1935) 
 0.1087 
(0.0934) 
  0.1010 
(0.0969) 
SOX * Multiple 
Directorship 
  -0.1023 
(0.1601) 
 -0.1114 
(0.1775) 
  0.1562** 
(0.0719) 
 0.0641 
(0.0801) 
SOX * Ownership    0.0036 (0.0053) 
0.0017 
(0.0059) 
   -0.0119*** 
(0.0016) 
-0.0087*** 
(0.0017) 
Observations 2,064 2,018 2,069 1,964 1,911 5,475 5,399 5,484 4,978 4,889 
R-Square 0.2718 0.2745 0.2687 0.2445 0.2704 0.2357 0.2422 0.2350 0.2301 0.2508 
Prob. > F Stat. 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Significant at 1% (***), 5% (**), and 10% (*) levels. 
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Table 14 
Intensity of Insider Trades and Internal Governance Mechanisms by Separate Regressions 
This table presents the relationship between the internal governance mechanisms and the intensity of trades by the CEOs through 
running an OLS regression on equation (7) on the full sample. Intensity is the natural logarithm of the proportion of total shares traded 
by a CEO in a year to the number of firm’s outstanding shares.  Explanatory variables include Board Independence, measured as the 
proportion of the number of independent directors to entire board size; Duality, a binary variable which is equal to one when the CEO 
and chairman of the board are the same individual and zero otherwise; Multiple Directorship, measured as the average number of 
outside directorships held by each director; and Director Ownership, measured as the total percentage of stocks held by independent 
directors. Control variables include Size, as the natural logarithm of total assets; the B/M ratio, as the book value of equity to the 
market value of equity; and Liquidity, as the proportion of annual traded shares to share outstanding.  
 Pre-SOX buy Post-SOX buy T-test 
(p-value) 
Pre-SOX sell Post-SOX sell T-test 
(p-value) 
Constant 9.3299*** (0.7288) 
5.6806*** 
(1.1313) 
 7.9243*** 
(0.5144) 
7.3198*** 
(0.5748) 
 
Independence -0.0161*** (0.0029) 
-0.0110* 
(0.0067) 
0.92 
(0.3573) 
-0.0126*** 
(0.0020) 
-0.0047* 
(0.0029) 
2.20 
(0.0279) 
Duality 0.4458*** (0.1207) 
0.3159* 
(0.1641) 
-0.33 
(0.7402) 
0.4295*** 
(0.0778) 
0.4729*** 
(0.0797) 
0.41 
(0.6822) 
Multiple Directorship -0.0262 (0.0703) 
-0.1174 
(0.1458) 
-0.32 
(0.7473) 
-0.1868*** 
(0.0489) 
-0.1362** 
(0.0684) 
0.82 
(0.4114) 
Director Ownership 0.0028 (0.0091) 
0.0041 
(0.0168) 
-0.28 
(0.7762) 
0.0035 
(0.0078) 
0.0066 
(0.0065) 
0.31 
(0.7600) 
Size -0.6091*** (0.0347) 
-0.4619*** 
(0.0510) 
 -0.4598*** 
(0.0244) 
-0.4443*** 
(0.0266) 
 
B/M -0.0175 (0.0118) 
0.4207*** 
(0.1129) 
 0.0174* 
(0.0104) 
-0.0828 
(0.1163) 
 
Liquidity 0.1459*** (0.0378) 
0.1723*** 
(0.0386) 
 0.0862*** 
(0.0132) 
0.0897*** 
(0.0181) 
 
Observations 1242 472  2152 1647  
R-Square 0.2619 0.2202  0.2541 0.2147  
Prob. > F Stat. 0.0000 0.0000  0.0000 0.0000  
Significant at 1% (***), 5% (**), and 10% (*) levels. 
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Table 15 
Corporate Governance and Level of Trades Underlying Nonpublic Information 
This table presents the impact of internal governance mechanisms on the proportion of trades with more significant underlying 
nonpublic information. The following are the results of the OLS regression of equation (8) in which the dependent variable is the 
proportion of the total number of shares traded with more significant nonpublic information in a year to all shares traded by the CEO in 
that year. Interactive variables between SOX and board characteristics show the change in the effectiveness of those characteristics due 
to SOX. 
 
 Buy Buy Sell Sell 
Constant 121.9453*** (16.7478) 
99.9436*** 
(17.0296) 
103.27*** 
(10.7611) 
35.9603*** 
(12.6323) 
Board Independence -0.0456 (0.0546) 
-0.0439 
(0.0546) 
-0.04447*** 
(0.0015) 
-0.0520*** 
(0.0040) 
Duality 2.1501 (1.9360) 
0.9318 
(2.2875) 
-0.0540 
(1.2192) 
-1.1876 
(1.6340) 
Multiple Directorship 0.1786 (1.3202) 
0.1268 
(1.3806) 
-0.0287 
(0.1163) 
0.0856 
(0.1756) 
Directors Ownership -0.0666 (1.3014) 
0.3081* 
(0.1759) 
-0.3927 
(0.8538) 
-0.4020 
(1.1017) 
Size -1.2567* (0.7017) 
-1.2292 
(0.7049) 
-1.0604** 
(0.4769) 
-1.0598** 
(0.4775) 
B/M -0.1430 (0.2267) 
-0.1492 
(0.2269) 
-0.0681* 
(0.2323) 
-0.0723 
(0.2338) 
Liquidity 0.1790 (0.6007) 
0.1792 
(0.5939) 
0.8201*** 
(0.2644) 
0.8106*** 
(0.2665) 
SOX -61.0118*** (0.5922) 
-40.1886*** 
(8.0824) 
-55.9375*** 
(2.7679) 
-50.0531*** 
(3.6235) 
SOX * Independence  -0.0224 (0.1624) 
 0.0167*** 
(0.0123) 
SOX * Duality  6.6022 (4.2682) 
 2.0786 
(2.5864) 
SOX *  Multiple 
Directorship 
 -1.4975 
(3.3911) 
 0.0348 
(1.8514) 
SOX * Ownership  -0.2782 (0.4040) 
 -0.2029 
(0.2330) 
Observations 1,763 1,763 3,794 3,794 
R-Square 0.2141 0.2234 0.3508 0.3511 
Significant at 1% (***), 5% (**), and 10% (*) levels. 
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Table 16 
Corporate Governance and Proportion of Trades with Different Levels of Underlying Nonpublic Information by Separate Regression 
This table presents the impact of the internal governance mechanisms on the trades with different significance (materiality) levels of underlying nonpublic information. The 
results are obtained through regression of equation (8) separately for before- and after-SOX eras for buy and sell trades.  Dependent variable is the proportion of the total number 
of shares traded with more material nonpublic information in a year to all shares traded by the CEO in that year. The explanatory and controlling variables are as explained in the 
text and prior tables.   
 Pre-SOX buy Post-SOX buy T-test 
(p-value) 
Pre-SOX sell Post-SOX sell T-test 
(p-value) 
Constant 69.2991*** (19.9475) 
87.5055*** 
(31.6108) 
 61.9853*** 
(12.9266) 
21.7919 
(17.2078) 
 
Independence 0.0430 (0.0627) 
0.0565 
(0.1414) 
0.20 
(0.8453) 
-0.05824** 
(0.0209) 
-0.03475* 
(0.0212) 
-2.79 
(0.0063) 
Duality -1.3227 (2.4568) 
4.8003 
(3.4343) 
1.53 
(0.1255) 
-1.1005 
(1.8439) 
0.8042 
(1.5151) 
0.77 
(0.3928) 
Multiple Directorship -0.8400 (1.4914) 
0.7559 
(3.2327) 
0.42 
(0.6772) 
0.1601 
(1.7556) 
-0.8009 
(1.0412) 
0.05 
(0.8643) 
Director Ownership 0.2244 (0.1861) 
0.4237 
(0.3409) 
0.39 
(0.6971) 
0.1481 
(0.1871) 
-0.2019 
(0.1865) 
-0.45 
(0.2878) 
Size -0.4608 (0.8785) 
-0.4702 
(1.2938) 
 -1.5227** 
(0.6019) 
-0.4834 
(0.7535) 
 
B/M -0.1723 (0.2394) 
2.9859 
(2.4338) 
 -0.1030 
(0.2396) 
7.003 
(2.2372) 
 
Liquidity 0.4119 (0.8357) 
-0.7229 
(0.8536) 
 1.0031*** 
(0.3407) 
0.2543 
(0.5131) 
 
Observations 1241 471  2148 1646  
R-Square 0.1854 0.3454  0.3467 0.3799  
Prob. > F Stat. 0.0001 0.0001  0.0001 0.0001  
Significant at 1% (***), 5% (**), and 10% (*) levels. 
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Table 17 
Test of Endogeneity 
This table shows the results for the test of a potential endogeneity (in the form of reverse causality) on the observed relationship 
between strength of internal governance mechanisms and  incidence of CEOs' informed insider trading. To rule out the possibility that 
the relationship is due to the influence of CEOs on the boards monitoring ability, rather than the hypothesized impact of board 
monitoring on trading behavior of CEOs, the relationship is reexamined by using a subsample of trades that are conducted by CEOs 
who are less likely to influence their affiliated firms'  board of directors due to their short tenures as CEO. The subsample, includes all 
trades by the CEOs whose tenure is equal to or shorter than two years at the time of the trade. Equation (8) is regressed for the 
subsample, where, as in tables 15 and 16,  the independent variable is the proportion of the number of shares traded in significantly 
informed trades by a CEO to the total number of shares traded by the CEO within a year. Explanatory, control and interactive variables 
are similar to those in previous tables. 
 
 Buy Buy Sell Sell 
Constant 0.0996 (0.2352) 
0.0802 
(0.2261) 
0.8088*** 
(0.1957) 
0.8331*** 
(0.1948) 
Independence -0.0004 (0.0007) 
-0.0005 
(0.0007) 
-0.0012* 
(0.0006) 
-0.0018** 
(0.0007) 
Duality 0.0409 (0.0261) 
0.0561* 
(0.0296) 
0.0691*** 
(0.0215) 
0.0787*** 
(0.0260) 
Multiple Directorship 0.0472** (0.0182) 
0.0537*** 
(0.0194) 
-0.0100 
(0.0141) 
-0.0098 
(0.0163) 
Director Ownership 0.0011 (0.0015) 
0.0015 
(0.0017) 
-0.0001 
(0.0021) 
-0.0018 
(0.0035) 
Size  -0.0053 (0.0088) 
-0.0376*** 
(0.0070) 
-0.0379*** 
(0.0070) 
B/M 0.0605* (0.0360) 
0.0018 
(0.0052) 
-0.0096 
(0.0311) 
-.0091 
(0.0312) 
Liquidity 0.0078 (0.0082) 
0.0091 
(0.0087) 
0.0245*** 
(0.0044) 
0.0251*** 
(0.0044) 
SOX -0.0666 (0.1080) 
0.0098 
(0.1974) 
0.0157 
(0.0598) 
-0.1666 
(0.1119) 
SOX * Independence  0.0005 (0.0023) 
 0.0024* 
(0.0013) 
SOX * Duality  -0.0592 (0.0643) 
 -0.0407 
(0.0452) 
SOX * Busyness  -0.0355 (0.0508) 
 0.0046 
(0.0306) 
SOX * Ownership  -0.0010 (0.0038) 
 0.0022 
(0.0043) 
Observations 406 406 357 357 
R-Square 0.2629 0.3540 0.3053 0.3144 
Significant at 1% (***), 5% (**), and 10% (*) levels. 
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